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PATIENTS' RIGHTS VS. PATIENTS' NEEDS: THE
RIGHT OF THE MENTALLY ILL TO REFUSE
TREATMENT IN COLORADO
NANCY L. SHAVILL*
Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the ani-
mals of nearby piggeries were better housed, fed, and treated than
many of the patients on their wards. I saw hundreds of sick people
shackled, strapped, straightjacketed, and bound to their beds....
I saw them crawl into beds jammed together, in dormitories filled
to twice or three times their normal capacity. I saw them incarcer-
ated in "seclusion rooms"-solitary isolation cells, really-for
weeks and months at a time. I saw signs of medical neglect, with
curable patients sinking into hopeless chronicity. I found . . . ex-
cruciating suffering stemming from prolonged, enforced idleness,
herdlike crowding, lack of privacy, depersonalization, and the over-
all atmosphere of neglect.'
Thus was the life of many inmates of mental institutions described
twenty years ago. Since that time many factors have alleviated the inhu-
mane and degrading conditions which persons, solely because of mental ill-
ness, have had to endure. Among these factors have been the development
and utilization of psychotropic medication, the deinstitutionalization of
mental patients, the patients' rights movement, and the community mental
health centers movement. 2 Concurrently, the courts have recognized the
right of mentally ill persons to be treated, 3 the right to due process in civil
commitment hearings, 4 the right to the least restrictive treatment alterna-
tive, 5 and the right to refuse treatment. 6 As a result, the conditions sur-
* B.A., DePauw University; M.A., University of Denver; J.D., University of Denver; can-
didate for the Colorado Bar; Legal Staff Assistant, Honorable George B. Lee, Jr., Arapahoe
District Court, 18th Judicial District.
1. Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Hearings on S B. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1961) (statement of Albert
Deutsch) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch, Statement].
2. There are now more than 500 community mental health centers in operation, which
have helped to reduce the inpatient population of mental institutions by two-thirds in 20 years.
Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 SCIENTIFIc AM. 46, 49
(1978).
3. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afdsub nom., Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
5. Id.; Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
6. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978), rev'd in part on rehearing, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979); Winters v. Miller, 306 F.
Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);
Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
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rounding the treatment of mental patients have improved considerably.
The last of the patients' rights to be recognized-the right to refuse
treatment-has raised a number of conflicts between the medical and legal
professions. In addition, some of the consequences of the exercise of the right
to refuse treatment have raised serious questions about the direction in
which the treatment of mental illness is heading and have shaken the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the mental health treatment system.
In Colorado, the right to refuse medication was first recognized by the
Department of Institutions, Division of Mental Health, in regulations pub-
lished in July 1979.' Prior to the promulgation of these regulations, how-
ever, a Colorado district court had issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the medication of an involuntary mental patient.8 The subse-
quent appeal of this order resulted in the Colorado Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the right to refuse medication in Goedecke v. Colorado9 in that an
involuntary mental patient could refuse the administration of psychotropic
medication unless his illness "has so impaired his judgment that he is incapa-
ble of participating in decisions affecting his health." 10
The recognition of the right to refuse medication in Colorado has had
considerable effect on the treatment of mental illness in the state. The au-
thor interviewed attorneys, mental health professionals, judges, and patients
to ascertain the impact of the exercise of the right to refuse medication on
the mental health treatment system. This paper will explore that impact,
placing it in perspective through a brief discussion of the history of the treat-
ment of mental illness and its legal bases, a description of the categories of
mental illness and the medications used to treat them, and the effect of the
exercise of the right to refuse medication on the patients, the mental health
professionals, the community at large, and the mental health treatment sys-
tem.
I. THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Throughout history the mentally ill have been cast among the rejects of
society. Viewed with varying tolerance in different cultures, the principal
method of dealing with the mentally ill until recently has been to segregate
them from the general population.It In colonial America, mentally ill per-
7. Department of Institutions, Care and Treatment of Mentally Ill, Rules and Regula-
tions, 2 C.C.R. 502-I (effective Aug. 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Regulations].
8. Interview with Physician A. The writer interviewed a number of mental health profes-
sionals, psychiatrists, patients, judges, and attorneys. Because some requested anonymity, all
will be referred to by letter. Physician A is a psychiatrist and the medical director of a commu-
nity mental health center which has been involved in a number of hearings regarding the right
to refuse medication.
9. 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
10. Id. at 125.
11. Soe N. KI-rRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY
56-65 (1971); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-8 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock eds.
1971) ]hereinafter cited as Brakel & Rock]. In the Middle Ages, in addition to the insane being
executed as witches or imprisoned, entire ships ("Ships of Fools") were chartered and filled with
insane persons for the purpose of transporting them to, and leaving them at, uninhabited
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sons were often kept locked in rooms or outhouses if cared for by family or
friends. 12 When family or friends were unable to provide assistance, the
mentally ill became subject to the institutions that developed both for the
control of deviants 13 and as a result of the poor laws.14 Mentally ill indi-
gents often wandered from place to place with other social outcasts and pau-
pers, 15 or they were confined in houses of correction, 16 jails, or almshouses
with children, the aged, prostitutes, vagrants, and drunkards, where they
were kept at the lowest possible cost to the community.17
In the mid-eighteenth century, the mentally ill began to be viewed as
treatable. Following the impetus of Philippe Pinel l a in France and William
Tuke in England, Dr. Benjamin Rush began to use new theories and meth-
places. N. KITTRIE, at 57. The feeling that the mentally ill are outcasts and that the bizarre
and annoying members of the community should be removed still exists today. See Mechanic,
Judthial Action and Social Change, in THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR MENTAL PATIENTS 47, 69
(S. Golann & W. Fremouw, eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Golann & Fremouw]; Stone, The
Right to Treatment and the Psychiatrt Estabhhmenl, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
289 (1977).
12. A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY FROM THE
COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR (1944).
Cornelius Boatman, adjudged in 1797 to be "a lunatic of unsound mind," enjoyed lucid
intervals but not so that he was capable of the management of himself and his property, consist-
ing of two hundred acres of land, thirty Negro slaves, and other personal property. A trustee
(Boarman's uncle) was appointed to care for Boarman and manage his estate. Throughout the
next thirty years, his estate was enjoyed and wasted by his trustees although
the estate of the lunatic was very productive, and more than sufficient to support him
in every comfort and luxury, . . . the trustees had treated him with great unkindness,
although he was very mild and inoffensive in his conduct; and they had kept him in an
outhouse, which was not sufficient to protect him from the weather; and with not
enough clothing, even of the coarsest kind, to shield him from the weather, not even
enough to cover his body and conceal his nakedness.
Boarman's Case, 2 Bland Ch. 89, 94 (Md. 1824).
13. See N. KIFRIE, supra note 11, at 63.
14. Id. at 60, 62.
15. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 4; Saphire, The Civi'lly Committed Publi Mental Patient
and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 232, 239 (1976).
16. N. KIT-rRIE, supra note 11, at 63. Houses of correction were first established to hold the
criminal, the indigent, and the insane. Connecticut's first house of correction, authorized in
1727, provided for the incarceration of
all rogues, vagabonds and idle persons going about in town or country begging, or
persons. . . feigning themselves to have knowledge in psysiognomy, palmistry, or pre-
tending that they can tell fortunes, . . . common . . . persons . . . and also persons
under distraction and unfit to go at large, whose friends do not take care for their safe
confinement.
Id.
17. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 292; Saphire, supra note 15, at 239. The Boston House of
Industry, for example, housed 60 insane or idiotic persons, about 130 ill and infirm, more than
100 children and infants, and 200 other "unclassified" inmates. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 293.
18. Pinel, after unchaining and then curing some of the inmates of a hospital for the insane
in Paris, wrote:
The insane man is not an inexplicable monster. He is but one of ourselves, only a
little more so. Underneath his wildest paroxysms there is a germ, at least, of rational-
ity and of personal accountability. To believe in this, to seek for it, stimulate it, build
it up-here lies the only way of delivering him out of the fatal bondage in which he is
held.
Quoted in A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 301. Pinel's "moral treatment" implied a mental condi-
tion which was curable in an appropriate psychological and social environment. Lipton & Bur-
nett, Pharmacological Treatment of Schizophrenta, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC
SYNDROME 320 (1979).
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ods to treat the mentally ill in the Philadelphia Hospital in 1783.19 He re-
jected punishment, cruelty, and most forms of restraint, while insisting that
attendants have adequate training, be kind, and employ every means to im-
prove the condition of the patients.20 The first private hospital for the in-
sane was founded in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1773,21 and the first state
hospital was established in Kentucky in 1824.22 Nevertheless, as late as the
1840's the majority of mentally ill persons were still confined in locked
rooms, cages, outhouses, jails, or poorhouses where they received no thera-
peutic treatment. 23 Dorothea Dix led the campaign for reform of the treat-
ment of the mentally ill, beginning in Massachusetts in 1843.24 Through her
leadership, state institutions for the mentally ill were founded in eleven states
and the District of Columbia before the Civil War.25 By 1860, 28 of the 33
states had established insane asylums, 26 and by 1870, nearly every state had
at least one public mental hospital. 27 These asylums were established in the
anticipation that modern, informed, and humane treatment would be pro-
vided 28 and represented a marked improvement in the treatment and care of
the mentally ill.
29
Public laws providing for the incarceration of the mentally ill were en-
acted as early as the late eighteenth century. A 1788 New York statute was
typical:
Whereas, there are sometimes persons who by lunacy or other-
wise are furiously mad, or are so disordered in their senses that they
may be dangerous to be permitted to go abroad; therefore, Be it
enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for any two or more jus-
tices of the peace to cause such person to be apprehended and kept
safely locked up in some secure place, and if such justices shall find
it necessary, to be there chained.
30
One basis for the authority of the states to confine the mentally ill was
19. The Philadelphia Hospital had opened in 1752 with a commission to care for "luna-
ticks" in addition to the sick and poor. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 300; Brakel & Rock, supra
note 11, at 5.
20. A. TYLER, supra note 12, at 301.
21. Id. at 300. Other early private institutions for the insane were the Quaker Retreat,
established near Philadelphia in 1817, the McLean Asylum in Massachusetts, founded in 1818,
the Bloomingdale Hospital in New York City, opened in 1821, and the Retreat in Hartford,
Connecticut, established in 1924. Id. at 302.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 304.
24. Id. at 305. In 1843, in an address to the Massachusetts legislature, Dix described the
state of insane persons in the Commonwealth as being confined "in cages, closets, cellars, stalls,
pens! Chained, naked, beaten with rods, and lashed into obedience." Id.
25. Id. at 305-06.
26. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 48.
27. Saphire, supra note 15, at 240.
28. S.B. Stickney, Wyatt v. Stickney: Background and Postscrp)t, in Golann & Fremouw,
supra note 11, at 29.
29. Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
30. 1788 N.Y. Laws ch. 31. As late as 1890, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the
Indiana commitment statute (§§ 5142-5150) was primarily for the "protection of the public
from those whose insanity makes them dangerous to the community. It has in it no feature of
charity to the individual, nor was it enacted with a view to benevolence." Board of Comm'rs v.
Ristine, 124 Ind. 242, 24 N.E. 990 (1890). See also Porter v. Rich, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169
(1898).
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their police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and morals
by enacting laws and regulations. 3 1 Under the police power, however, the
means adopted for the protection of the public must be only those that are
reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective of the law, and may not be
unduly oppressive upon the individuals regulated.
32
A second basis under which states exercised control over the mentally ill
was theparenspartae power. At the time of the colonization of America, the
King had powers and duties as the "father of the country" to act as "the
general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics" and all other persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves. 33 After the American Revolu-
tion, theparenspalriae power of the King passed to the states and their legis-
latures. 34 With regard to the mentally ill, the parens patriae power was
originally exercised to protect their property and to provide for their care.
35
It was not until 1845 that the parens talrzae power of the state was used to
detain the mentally ill in order to facilitate their rehabilitation. 36 While
recognizing that under the police power "[tihe right to restrain an insane
person of his liberty is found in that great law of humanity, which makes it
necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to them-
selves or others," the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a person
could be confined under the doctrine ofparenspalrt'ae when restraint is "nec-
essary for his restoration, or will be conducive thereto."'37 Toward the end of
the nineteenth century, the criterion of need for care and treatment was in-
creasingly included in statutes regarding the commitment of the mentally ill
31. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,
1222 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
32. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1961). For a discussion of the
right to refuse medication and the police power, see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145
(D.N.J. 1978).
33. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971) (quoting Blackstone). See Brakel
& Rock, supra note 1I, at 1-4; N. KITrRIE, supra note 11, at 8-11; Developments in the Law, supra
note 31, at 1206-22.
34. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971). See also Developments in the Law,
supra note 31, at 1208. In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), theparenspatrzae
power was said to be "inherent in the supreme power of every state ... and often necessary to
be exercised in the interest of humanity." Id. at 57.
35. English law distinguished between the idiot-a person who "hath no understanding
from his nativity"-and the lunatic-a person who "hath understanding, but . . .hath lost the
use of his reason." The statute De Praerogativa Regis, enacted between 1255 and 1290, codified
this distinction, and provided that the lands of idiots were granted to the King. After providing
the idiot with necessaries, the King retained the profits from the land; the land was returned to
the idiot's heirs after his death. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 2. See Yeomans v. Williams, 43
S.E. 73 (Ga. 1907); Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. 446 (1889).
Under.the power delegated to the Chancery, in England by the King and in America by
state legislatures, committees or guardians were appointed to manage the estate of the incom-
petent person. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 3-4; Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at
1209. See McCord v. Ochiltree, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 15, 16-17 (1848); Rebecca Owings Case, I
Bland (Md.) 280 (1827); In re Mason, I Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 436 (1847); Case of John Beaumont, I
Whart. (Pa.) 52 (1835).
36. Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1209.
37. In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845). Oakes, who was not a violent person,
had been detained because he allegedly suffered from hallucinations and displayed unsoundness
of mind in conducting his business affairs. Only a few days after the death of his wife, Oakes, an
elderly and ordinarily prudent man, had become engaged to a young woman of unsavory char-
acter.
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in addition to the criterion of dangerousness to self and others. 38
As early as 1875, however, hospital administrators had begun to com-
plain that the original purpose of state hospitals for the mentally ill was
being subverted by the involuntary commitment of paupers, old people,
mental defectives, harmless eccentrics, and vagrants.3 9 The county alms-
houses were disappearing, 40 and growing industrialization and urbanization
contributed to the increasing institutionalization of deviants of all sorts.4 1 In
addition, a "gentleman's agreement" emerged, in which physicians, judges,
and families found it convenient to commit unwanted people to state hospi-
tals. 42 The institutions' increasing inability to cope with the growing
number of inmates led to an era of custodialism. 4 3 By the middle of the
twentieth century, nearly 600,000 mentally ill persons were hospitalized.
44
Most hospitals were overcrowded and understaffed. In spite of the fact that
patients were committed for care and treatment, they received only some
care and very little treatment.4 5 In 1961, the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health estimated that more than half of all institutionalized
mental patients received no active treatment. 46 Mentally ill persons-hope-
less and impoverished, with little power and discredited social status-were,
in effect, warehoused. 4 7 "The fault lay not with individual physicians, nurses
38. See § 2217 of the California Political Code, as amended in 1881, cited in Exparte Clary,
149 Cal. 232, 87 P. 580 (1906); Speedling v. County of Worth, 80 Iowa 153, 26 N.W. 50 (1885);
Van Deusen v. Newcomber, 40 Mich. 80 (1879); Richardson County v. Frederick, 24 Neb. 596,
39 N.W. 621 (1887); Brickway's Case, 80 Pa. 65 (1875). All fifty states now have commitment
statutes based on the parens patriae rationale. Ford, The Psychiatrist's Double Bind The Right to
Refuse Medication, 137 AM. J. PsYcH. 332, 335 (1980); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1134, 1138 (1967).
39. Stickney, supra note 28, at 30.
40. Id.
41. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 49.
42. Stickney, supra note 28, at 30.
43. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 49.
44. Peele, Chodoff & Taub, Involuntary Hospitalization and Treatability: Observations from the
District of Columbia Experience, 23 CAT-. U.L. REV. 744, 749 (1974).
45. At Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1971, there were only three medical
doctors with some psychiatric training (including one board-eligible but no board-certified psy-
chiatrist), one Ph.D. clinical psychologist, and two M.S.W. social workers involved in therapeu-
tic programs for 5,000 patients. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), af d sub
nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Golann, The Core Problem Controversy, in Golann & Fremouw, supra note 11, at 99.
47. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 50. A physician described one institution in the mid-fifties
as having huge barn-like structures which housed the patients, providing no privacy of any
kind. One method of keeping patients under control was the regular use of electroshock treat-
ment (ECT or EST). The facility was clean, however, and some patients who could work had a
job. There was very little in the way of treatment. Interview with Physician B. Physician B is
the director of psychiatry of a large private hospital. The psychiatric ward is small, and patients
come either through the emergency room or on a contract basis from a community mental
health center. The ward is crisis-oriented, and the average length of stay is five days.
A 1956 article reported, "Patients at Columbus State get EST once, twice, or three times a
week, and in a few cases oftener." Martin, Inside the Asylum, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 10,
1956, 36, cited in Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 163. These conditions continued into the mid-
seventies. A West Virginia court commented in 1974 that "the State of West Virginia offers to
those unfortunates who are incarcerated in mental institutions Dickensian squaler of uncon-
scionable magnitudes." State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E. 109, 120 (W. Va. 1974).
In 1976, an Ohio institution had living conditions substandard and dangerous to both
the mental and physical health of the patients. Housekeeping and maintenance were
extremely poor; many of the physical structures presented fire and safety hazards,
[Vol. 58:3
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or attendants-underpaid, undervalued, and overworked as they were-but
with the general community that not only tolerated but enforced these sub-
human conditions through financial penury, ignorance, fear and indiffer-
ence." 48 Out of these conditions emerged the community mental health
centers movement and the patients' rights movement.
49
The development of comprehensive community-based treatment pro-
grams through community mental health centers was made possible by the
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Con-
struction Act of 1963.50 Established with "seed money" from the federal
government, the centers were to provide five essential services in areas with
populations between 75,000 and 200,000: inpatient care, outpatient care,
emergency treatment, partial hospitalization, and consultation and educa-
tion. 5 ' The feasibility of community mental health services was enhanced
by the development and subsequent widespread use of antipsychotic medica-
tions52 which enabled thousands of patients who were previously managea-
ble only in institutional settings to be released and treated as outpatients.
53
In addition, a large number of patients were released because institutions
were unable to meet the financial burden of enlarging and upgrading their
facilities to relieve the overcrowding. 54 By the mid-1970's, the population of
mental institutions had been reduced to less than 250,000.
5 5
The deinstitutionalization of mental patients was furthered by the judi-
cial narrowing of criteria for commitment. Merely being mentally ill or in
need of treatment could no longer serve as the basis for commitment. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson,56 the United States Supreme Court found that "a
State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individ-
ual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help
of willing and responsible family members or friends. ' 57 Thus, dangerous-
ness to self or others or incapacity to survive on one's own are now the only
while patient areas were generally filthy and malodorous. Moreover, the cottages or
patient living quarters were so crowded that privacy and quiet were nonexistent even
during the night.
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
In addition to the antitherapeutic, dangerous, and inhuman conditions at that institution,
patients were subjected to an alarming number of incidents of physical and sexual abuse by the
staff, id. at 101, adequate care and treatment was virtually impossible, id. at 102, and medica-
tion was often administered inappropriately in light of the patients' given diagnoses and symp-
tomatology, id. at 109.
48. Deutsch, Statement, supra note 1, at 41-42.
49. Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 9-10.
50. Pub. L. No. 88-164, §§ 200-207, 77 Stat. 290 (1963) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
51. Bassuk & Gerson, supra note 2, at 48.
52. See text accompanying notes 146-84 infra.
53. Bellak, An Idzsncratli Overview, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME 3-4
(1979); DuBose, Of he Parens Patriae Commztment Power and Drug Treatment for Schiophrema: Do
the Benefits to the Patients justi Inzoluntay Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1169 (1976).
54. Mechanic,upra note 11, at 51. See Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
55. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 41 (1976).
56. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
57. Id. at 576. Donaldson had been confined in the Florida State Hospital against his
wishes for fifteen years. The jury had found that Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to
himself nor to others, was provided no treatment. Id. at 577 n. 12.
1981]
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grounds upon which a mentally ill person can be committed.
58
The patients' rights movement emerged in 1960 with the publication of
an article on the right to treatment, 59 although the duty of the state to treat
those which it confined because of mental illness was recognized as early as
1915 in Hammon v. HR, where the court stated that the state's duty "extends
so far as to include every provision known to medical skill and science for the
treatment of the diseased mind." 6 The right to treatment was first upheld
in Rouse v. Cameron,6 1 in 1966. Since that decision, at least three constitu-
tional arguments have been propounded to support this right. The first con-
stitutional argument, on the grounds of due process, was articulated in Walt
v. Slickney. 62 "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due proc-
ess." 63 The right to treatment has also been upheld on the constitutional
grounds of equal protection
64 and cruel and unusual punishment.
65
A second right of persons with mental illness is the right to the least
restrictive alternative treatment. 66 Courts have held that patients have the
right to be treated in the least restrictive setting within an institution
67 and
that alternatives less restrictive than hospitalization should be considered
58. Dangerousness is extremely hard to predict. See A. STONE, supra note 55, at 25-38;
Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual, American Psych. Ass'n Task Force Rep. 8, 23-30 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Clinical Aspects]; Cocozza & Steadman, Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Griffith & Grif-
fith, Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for
Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 241 (1978); Monahan, Pedction Research and the Emer-
genc Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons:. A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 198 (1978);
Shah, Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Polihy Considerations, 132
AM. J. PSYCH. 501 (1975); Simon & Cockerham, Civil Commitment, Burden of Proof and Dangerous
Acts: A Comparison of Perspectives ofljudges and Psychiatrists, 5 J. PSYCH. & L. 571 (1977); Sosowsky,
Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the
State and the Mentally I/, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 33 (1978); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be
Predited?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972); Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at
1236-45.
59. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
60. 228 F. 999, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1915) (dictum).
61. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
63. Id. at 785. See also Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Stachulak
v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); State ex rel. R.G.W., 145 N.J. Super. 167, 366
A.2d 1375 (1976); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to
Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1282, 1288 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Harv. Comment].
64. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), aJ'dsub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Goodman,
Right to Treatment: Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 680, 690 (1969); Harv. Comment,
supra note 63, at 1293.
65. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Developments in the Law, supra note
31, at 1330-33; Harv. Comment, supra note 63, at 1292.
66. Arons, Working in the "Cuckoo's Nest'" An Essay on Recent Changes in Mental Health Law and
the Changing Role of Pschiatrists in Relation to Patient and Society, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 87 (1977);
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill. Pratical Guides and Constittional Im-
perattes, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); Goodman, supra note 64, at 697; Schwartz, In the Name
of Treatment- Autonomy, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW.
808, 833, 835 (1975); Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1245-53.
67. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp.
1196 (M.D. Ohio 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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when committing the mentally ill. 68 The community mental health centers
movement 69 has facilitated the implementation of the right to the least re-
strictive alternative treatment. The right to the least restrictive alternative
has also been applied to organic therapies, including medication.
70
The most recent of mental patients' rights to be recognized is the right
to refuse treatment. 7' Courts have upheld the right to refuse psychosur-
gery 72 and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), 7 3 and the right to refuse seclu-
sion if not properly supervised by a physician. 74 Since 1978, the right to
refuse medication has been sustained in New Jersey,
75 Massachusetts, 76
Oklahoma, 77 Utah,78 Ohio, 79 and Colorado.8 0 Five constitutional argu-
ments have been advanced to justify the right to refuse treatment in general
and medication in particular: the right to privacy, equal protection, due
process, free expression, and cruel and unusual punishment.
The right to privacy,8 ' first upheld in Grzswoldv. Connecltcut, 12 is said to
be found within "penumbras" surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments.8 3 Several cases have since held that the right to privacy
includes the right to decline medical treatment in certain circumstances.
8 4
The right to privacy extends to protection against unwanted intrusions into
bodily integrity, and in fact, this protection-"the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person"-was first recognized in
1890.85 The freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions has been applied in a
68. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Harv. Comment, supra note 63, at 1295.
69. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
70. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978).
71. See A. STONE, supra note 55; DuBose, supra note 53; Ford, supra note 38; Griffith &
Griffith, supra note 58; Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Org: Mental Patients 'Right to Refuse Treat-
ment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 66; Comment, Advances in Mental
Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Advances 6n Mental Health ]; Comment, Forced Drug Medication ofInvoluntarily Committed Mental Pa-
tients, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Forced Drug Medication].
72. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73019434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
10, 1973), reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, I LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HAND-
ICAPPED, 785-821 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973).
73. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
74. Negron v. Preiser, 382 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
75. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
76. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
77. In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
78. A.E. v. Mitchell, No. C 78-466 (D. Utah 1980).
79. Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (U.S.D.C., Ohio, Sept. 16, 1980).
80. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
81. The existence of a right to privacy was first suggested in the article, Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold held that a married couple had a constitutional right to
privacy which protected their use of contraceptives in the home. Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion stated that "the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed
to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."
Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 483.
84. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Quinlin, 70 N.J. 40, 54, 355 A.2d
647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
85. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). This case forbade a district court to
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number of different contexts, 86 including the right to refuse medication. It
has been held that in a nonemergency situation, "it is an unreasonable inva-
sion of privacy, and an affront to basic concepts of human dignity, to permit
forced injection of a mind-altering drug into the buttocks of a competent
person unwilling to give informed consent."8 7
The right of mental patients to refuse treatment has also been based on
equal protection and due process grounds. Competent physically ill persons
may refuse treatment unless there is a life-threatening emergency, in which
situation treatment will be administered against the wishes of the patient
only in very limited circumstances. 88 In contrast, mentally ill persons are
not per se incompetent solely because they have been diagnosed as being
mentally ill.89 To deny the mentally ill the right to refuse medication simply
because of their illness violates their right to equal protection. 90 Since com-
petence is the criterion upon which is grounded the ability to give, or refuse
to give, informed consent for the administration of medication, the involun-
tary administration of medication without a prior determination of lack of




The first amendment's protection of freedom of expression also supports
the right to refuse medication: 92 "A person's mental processes, the commu-
nication of ideas, and the generation of ideas, come within the ambit of the
First Amendment. To the extent that the First Amendment protects the
dissemination of ideas and the expressions of thoughts, it equally must pro-
tect the individual's right to generate ideas." 93 In order to communicate, the
ability to think is essential, and medication administered in the treatment of
order a surgical examination in a tort case. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Forced
Drug Medication, supra note 71.
86. In Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968), a rectal search, based on
"mere suspicion," made at the Mexican border was held to be unconstitutional. Perhaps the
most famous case involving the violation of bodily integrity and the right of privacy was based
on the fourth amendment. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court
ruled that the pumping of a suspected narcotics dealer's stomach to obtain evidence was "illegal
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner," id. at 172, and constituted "conduct that shocks the
conscience," id.
87. Davis v. Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (U.S.D.C., Ohio, Sept. 16, 1980). See Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1369 (D. Mass. 1979); In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d
747, 751 (Okla. 1980).
88. In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
89. Plotkin, supra note 71, at 496. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 965 (1971), the court held that a woman, who had been committed involuntarily
because of mental illness but who was competent and who refused medication on religious
grounds, could refuse medication.
90. "If we were dealing here with an ordinary patient suffering from a physical ailment,
the hospital authorities would have no right to impose compulsory medical treatment against
the patient's will and to do so would constitute. . . battery." Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
91. Plotkin, supra note 71, at 496.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73019434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
10, 1973).
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mental illness often impairs that ability.94 In fact, one purpose of the use of
antipsychotic medication is to change aberrant thought patterns. 9 5 The
Supreme Court has written that "[olur whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
'9 6
Thus, under the first amendment, mental patients have the right to refuse
medication which affects their thought processes.
9 7
A final argument supporting the right to refuse medication is that
forced medication subjects a patient to cruel and unusual punishment.
Courts have supported the right of mentally ill persons to refuse medication
on this ground only in a criminal context. 98
II. MENTAL ILLNESS, DRUG TREATMENT, AND POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS
The diagnostic classifications of major mental illnesses are depression,
manic-depressive disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder.
Medication is a major form of treatment for each classification; however, all
medications have potential side effects which, if they occur, may be more
disturbing to the patients than the mental illness itself.99
A. Marnc-depressive dtiorder
Manic-depressive disorder, also known as bipolar affective disorder, is a
cyclic affective disorder'0° characterized by either recurrent attacks of mania
or alternating attacks of mania and depression.10 1 In the manic phase,
symptoms include a bizarre increase in psychomotor activity, grandiosity,'
0 2
reduced need for sleep, flight of ideas, elation, poor judgment, aggressiveness,
and sometimes hostility.' 0 3 In the depressive phase, the symptoms resemble
those of major depression.'°4
Lithium carbonate is the preferred treatment for manic-depressive ill-
ness;' 0 5 however, the onset of the drug's action is slow, as it becomes effective
only after two weeks of continuous administration.' 0 6 For these reasons,
acute, severely manic patients are often treated concurrently with anti-
psychotic medication,' 07 and severely depressed patients are treated concur-
94. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra.
96. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
97. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979).
98. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976).
99. See text accompanying notes 223-28 infra.
100. Affective disorders are mood disorders. See DuBose, supra note 53, at 1180 n.75.
101. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGy: BAStC PRINCIPLES IN THERAPEUTICS 865 (2d ed. K.
Melmon & H. Morrelli 1978) [hereinafter cited as Melmon & Morrellil.
102. Id.; PHYSICtAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1518-19 (34th ed. 1980).
103. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1518-19.
104. Physician A, supra note 8; Interview with Physician C. Physician C is a staff psychia-
trist at both a community mental health center and a residential treatment center.
105. A description of the pharmacological action of lithium carbonate is found in Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866. Lithium carbonate was the first psychotropic medication to
be discovered. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 357.
106. Physician A, supra note 8; Physician C, supra note 104.
107. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866. See text accompanying notes 146-84 bifra.
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rently with tricyclic antidepressants. '0 For lesser degrees of mania, lithium
alone is usually sufficient.' 0 9 Because lithium carbonate acts as a prophylac-
tic, it is often used on a long-term maintenance basis to prevent or diminish
the intensity of subsequent manic or depressive episodes." 0
Lithium carbonate is potentially very toxic and has a low therapeutic
index;' " that is, there is a very small margin between a therapeutic dose and
a toxic dose.1 12 Toxicity may therefore occur at dosages close to therapeutic
levels." 3 Among the symptoms of toxicity are nausea, diarrhea, thirst, slug-
gishness, dazed feelings, muscle weakness, and hand tremors. As toxicity in-
creases, symptoms include lack of coordination, drowsiness, coarse tremors,
muscle twitching, and eventually stupor, coma, and death.I1 4 In addition,
upon initial administration of lithium carbonate, patients may experience
mild and transient nausea, mild thirst, and general discomfort, which usu-
ally disappear within a few days. 115 Long-term use of lithium carbonate
may lead to thyroid enlargement with diminished thyroid function." 
6
B. Depression
Depression is characterized by feelings of sadness, fatigue, loss of interest
in the social environment, self neglect, lowering of functional activity, insom-
nia, hopelessness, and fear that the condition is permanent." 7 Suicidal pre-
occupation, depersonalization, apathy, anorexia, and guilt feelings may also
be present. I"' There are several different approaches to the classification of
108. Physician C, supra note 104. See text accompanying notes 127-33 infra; A. BECK, ela.,
COGNITIVE THEORY OF DEPRESSION 355, 364 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as A. BECK].
109. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866.
110. Physician A, supra note 8; Physician C, supra note 104; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1518. See A. BECK, supra note 108, at 355; Kocsis & Stokes, Lithiun Mainte-
nance: Factors Afecting Outcome, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 563 (1979).
111. See Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867.
112. Interview with Physician D. Physician D is the staff psychiatrist in charge of a division
of a large residential treatment center. He has had a number of patients who have refused
medication. He has gone to court on two occasions for hearings on petitioners' requesting the
involuntary administration of medication. Medication was ordered in both. See Melmon &
Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867.
113. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 990 (24th ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as MEDICAL DICTIONARY]; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1518. Also
known as nephrotoxicity, the symptoms are the result of damage to the kidney cells. Drug Toxic-
ity and Physician's Liability, 3 MASS. GENERAL HOSPITAL NEWSLETTER, BILOGICAL THERAPIES
IN PSYCH. 21 (1980); MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at 992.
114. These are the symptoms of the onset of mild toxicity. As toxicity increases, symptoms
include lack of coordination, drowsiness, coarse tremors, muscle twitching, and eventually stu-
por and coma. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1519.
115. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1520. If.any of the symptoms of
toxicity appear the drug should be stopped immediately, as continued use of the drug is poten-
tially lethal. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra
note 102, at 1519-20.
116. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 867-68. About five percent of patients taking
lithium develop hypothyroidism. Lithium, Hypothyroidism, and CPK, 3 MASS. GENERAL HosPI-
TAL NEWSLETrER, BIOLOGICAL THERAPIES IN PSYCH. 22 (1980).
117. N. KLINE, DEPRESSION: ITS DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 10 (1969); MEDICAL DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 113, at 400.
118. N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 10.
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the depressive disorder, 1 19 among which are major vs. minor,' 20 psychotic
vs. neurotic,1 21 endogenous vs. reactive,' 22 and bipolar vs. unipolar., 23 No
matter which classification is used, all forms of depression may be treated
with medication. 124 In the less serious forms of depression, medication is
most likely to be used on a short-term basis to relieve the immediate acute
symptoms. In the more serious forms of depression, medication may be used
on a long-term maintenance basis.1
25
Tricyclic antidepressants are the drugs most often used to treat depres-
sion. 126 They elevate the person's mood and biochemically increase the per-
son's ability to cope. 127 Tricyclic antidepressants may produce a number of
side effects including such anticholinergic symptoms as dry mouth and
blurred vision; allergic reactions such as rash, itching, and increased sensiti-
119. Kielholz, Opening Address.- Diagnostic Aspects in the Treatment of Depression, in DEPRESSIVE
ILLNESS, DIAGNOSIS, ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT 12 (1972). See N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 10-
12.
120. The following criteria are used to diagnose a major depressive disorder:
A. One or more distinct periods of dysphoric mood or pervasive loss of interest or
pleasure.
B. Five or more of the following:
1. Increase or decrease in appetite or weight.
2. Excessive or insufficient sleep.
3. Low energy, fatigability, or tiredness.
4. Psychomotor agitation or retardation.
5. Loss of interest or pleasure in usual activities.
6. Feelings of self-reproach, guilt.
7. Decreased ability to think or concentrate.
8. Recurrent thoughts of death or suicide.
C. Duration of dysphoric features for at least two weeks.
D. Sought help or sustained functional impairment.
E. No other major diagnoses (e.g., schizophrenia).
Minor depression is diagnosed when some of the features of the major depressive disorder are
present, but the most prominent feature is a prevailing mood of depression with no psychotic
episodes. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 360.
121. The American Psychiatric Association, in its 1968 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-II), distinguished a single nonpsychotic depression (depressive neurosis) and five types of
psychotic depression (psychotic depressive reaction; involuntional melancholia; and manic-de-
pressive illness, manic, depressed, and circular types). A. BECK, supra note 108, at 362.
122. Endogenous depressions are thought to have a biochemical cause. According to this
theory, the persons affected are prone to depression because of some lack of neurotransmission
in the "coping system" of the brain. Stresses, to which a normal person would react by having a
transient feeling of the "blues" and with which they would be able to adequately cope, caused
reactions in the person with endogenous depression greatly disproportionate to the precipitating
event.
Reactive depressions, on the other hand, are thought to be caused solely by a stressful event
to which the degree of depression is usually proportionate. In this form of depression, interest,
ability to cope, and ability to work may be diminished but are not entirely absent. Melmon &
Morelli, supra note 101, at 850. See also A. BECK, supra note 108, at 363; N. KLINE, supra note
117, at 1315; Kuhn, Clinical Experinces with a New Antidepressant, in DEPRESSIVE ILLNESS, DIAG-
NOSIS, ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT 195 (1972).
123. Bipolar depression is the depressive phase of manic-depressive disorder. See text ac-
companying notes 100-10 supra. Unipolar depressions are distinguished from manic-depressive
disorders because of the absence of manic periods and fewer total episodes of depression.
Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 850.
124. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 363.
125. Id. at 356.
126. Id. at 355.
127. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016. Tricyclic antidepressants vary
both in their sedative and their anticholinergic effects, and the choice of drug is usually made
with these variances in mind. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 855.
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zation to the sun; and such gastrointestinal reactions as nausea, peculiar
taste, and abdominal cramps.128 In addition, they may cause adverse psy-
chological effects, including confusional states accompanied by hallucina-
tions, disorientation, delusions, anxiety, restlessness, insomnia, panic, and
nightmares.12 9 Both neurological and cardiovascular reactions may also oc-
cur, 130 and a toxic overdose may produce, among other things, shock, stu-
por, coma, and death.' 3' Older persons may not be able to take
antidepressants; 132 consequently electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) may be
the only effective treatment 133 for elderly persons with severe psychotic de-
pression.
Monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors have also been used in the treat-
ment of depression.' 34 They are rarely the first drugs used and are most
suitable for patients who have failed to respond to tricyclic antidepres-
sants.' 35 They have been found to be effective in depressed patients classi-
fied as "atypical," "nonendogenous," or "neurotic."1 36 They should not be
used in combination with, or within two weeks following, the administration




Schizophrenia is a disorder manifested in pathological disturbances of
thought, mood, and behavior.' 38 Among the symptoms associated with
128. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016-17. Hematologic reactions
such as bone marrow depression and agranulocytosis also occur. Id. at 1017. See text accompa-
nying notes 180-82 zinfa.
129. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.
130. Tricyclic antidepressants lower the convulsive threshold, increasing the possibility of
seizures. Other neurological reactions may be numbness, tingling, and extrapyramidal side ef-
fects (see text accompanying notes 163-68 infta). Therapeutic doses have produced palpitations,
tachycardia and orthostatic hypotension (reduced blood pressure), abnormalities in the electro-
cardiagram and arrhythmias, myocardial damage, congestive heart failure, and death. Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.
131. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
102, at 1017.
132. "The incidence of adverse drug reaction steadily increases with age. Beyond 60 years
of age, there is a progressive reduction of tissue mass, as well as renal, hepatic, and cardiovascu-
lar function." Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 63.
133. Physician D, supra note 112; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 355. Electroconvulsive ther-
apy (ECT), also known as electroshock therapy, has been described as "a technique by which a
current of from 70 to 130 volts of electricity is permitted to flow through the patient's brain,
causing a convulsion equivalent to an epileptic seizure." New York City Health and Hosp.
Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 946-47, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463-64 (Sup. Ct. 1972). For the
involutional melancholia form of psychotic depression, ECT is the treatment of choice. A.
BECK, srupra note 108, at 363.
134. N. KLINE, supra note 117, at 13; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at
1327.
135. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1327.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1016.
138. The American Psychiatric Association has defined schizophrenia as follows:
a group of disorders manifested by characteristic disturbances of thinking, mood and
behavior. Disturbances in thinking are marked by alterations of concept formation
which may lead to misinterpretation of reality and sometimes to delusions and halluci-
nations, which frequently appear psychologically self-protective. Corollary mood
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acute schizophrenia are unrealistic thinking, severe anxiety, excessive suspi-
ciousness, perplexity or confusion, social withdrawal, auditory hallucina-
tions, blunted affect, overactivity, feeling of impending doom, and
generalized motor inhibition. 139 Manifestations of schizophrenia may also
be very subtle, so that some persons who have the illness may be considered
to be only eccentric. 140 The functioning of chronic schizophrenics is often
severely impaired, W' and many are unable to deal with the stresses of every-
day life. 14 2 Ten percent of all schizophrenics need prolonged custodial
care,' 43 and less than fifteen percent of individuals who are so seriously af-
fected as to require prolonged hospitalization ever function normally.'
44
Schizophrenia is the most prevalent disorder in the mental health system,
accounting for nearly half of all patients.'
45
Schizophrenia is treated with antipsychotic or psychotropic medica-
tion.146 The most widely used of the antipsychotic drugs are the phenothia-
changes include ambivalent, constricted and inappropriate emotional responsiveness
and loss of empathy with others. Behavior may be withdrawn, regressive, and bizarre.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968), quoted in DuBose, supra note 53, at 1180 n.75.
139. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1181. Dr. Will described the process of schizophrenia:
The acutely disturbed schizophrenic person finds that much that is in his awareness is
no longer familiar to him; his thinking is disordered by the presence of vague, poorly
organized symbols of previous anxiety-fraught interpersonal relationships. The refer-
ents and meaning of these symbols are unclear and cannot be communicated to others.
As communication fails isolation increases, and the sufferer finds himself caught in a
nightmare, driven by a feeling of urgency to make sense of the incomprehensibles with
which he is involved. He seeks a simple formula to make all clear, and if he is unfortu-
nate he may elaborate and paranoid solution with its gradiosity, apportioning of
blame, and chronic reformulation of the past and present to refine and protect a "sys-
tem" that will reduce anxiety. The cost of such a caricaturing of human living is
high-for the patient and anyone with any vestige of interest in him. When the ties of
human relatedness are poorly developed and fragile, despair may enter the scene . . .
formal relationships are abandoned along with hope, and the organism becomes its
own object and the referent of poorly organized symbols of interpersonal affairs. Here
anxiety may be held in check through the maintenance of disorganization.
10 WILL, PROCESS, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SCHIZOPHRENIA IN PSYCHOTHERAPY OF THE PSY-
CHOSIS 31-32 (1961), quoted in Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 755, 769 (1969). For a survey of systems for diagnosis of schizophrenia currently in
use, see Carpenter & Strauss, Diagnostc Issues in Schzophrenia, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZO-
PHRENIC SYNDROME, 299-304 (1979).
140. There are two theories as to the cause of schizophrenia. One is that it is the result of
pathologic social-family relationships. The second theory is that it is caused by abnormal bio-
chemical-genetic influences. The fact that chemotherapy ameliorates the symptoms supports
the theory that schizophrenia is primarily a biological rather than a psychological disorder. See
Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857. There remains a considerable shortage of informa-
tion about the variety of defects which underlie the schizophrenic syndrome. Meltzer, Biochem'.
cal Studis in Schizophrenta, in DISORDERS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME 45 (1979).
141. Physician D, supra note 112; Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 856-57.
142. Physician D, supra note 112.
143. Bellak, supra note 53, at 6.
144. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857.
145. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1151.
146. Antipsychotic drugs are also used for treatment of schizoaffective disorders (accompa-
nied by either mania or depression), as a useful adjunctive treatment for mania (see text accom-
panying note 107 supra), and for symptomatic control of psychoses associated with old age.
They should be used only minimally for depression and should not be used to treat psychoses
associated with acute brain syndromes due to withdrawal from other drugs or associated with
hallucinogenic drugs. Melmon & Morrelli, sura note 101, at 861-62.
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zine derivatives. 147  Other antipsychotic medications in use are the
butyrophenones, the thioxanithenes, loxapine, and molindone.1
4
3 Most of
these drugs are equally efficacious,' 49 but vary in potency. 150  Individual
patients respond differently to different medications, and a wide range of
possible therapeutic doses of antipsychotic drugs is available.15'
Antipsychotic medications work by affecting the function of the neuro-
transmitters in the brain.' 52 They are used both to ameliorate the acute
symptoms of schizophrenia 153 and on a long-term, maintenance basis to
prevent the symptoms' return.' 54 Some schizophrenics, however, receive no
benefit from antipsychotic medication,' 5 5 and others may do as well or bet-
ter without drug treatment.' 6 In addition, while psychotropic drugs have a
147. Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 857-58; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 322,
325.
148. See Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 857, 859; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at
325-27.
149. Physician D, supra note 112; Mellmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 857-62; Lipton &
Burnett, supra note 18, at 327.
150. For example, 2 mg. of Haldol (haloperidol) have the same antipsychotic effect as 100
mg. of Thorazine (chlorpromazine). The antipsychotic drugs also vary in their sedative effect,
the less potent having a greater sedative effect than the more potent. Physician D, supra note
112; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 329.
151. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
152. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 895; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
102, at 673; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 323.
153. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
Among the symptoms which antipsychotic medications relieve are thought disturbance, para-
noid symptoms, delusions, social withdrawal, loss of self-care, anxiety, and agitation. Melmon
& Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862; Schwartz, supra note 66, at 812. Combativeness disappears,
and patients become relaxed and cooperative. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1194; Schwartz, supra
note 66, at 813.
154. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862-63; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 333.
The use of antipsychotic medication on a maintenance basis resembles the use of insulin by
diabetics or the use of antihypertensive medication by persons with high blood pressure. Treat-
ment is considered to be indefinite and uninterrupted, although the dosage may vary and be
considerably reduced during the length of the treatment. A sizeable number of readmissions to
hospitals have been traced to the reappearance of symptoms caused by the patient's stopping
the use of medication. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862-63. See also Opler, Tardive
Dyskinesia and Institutional Practice: Current Issues and Guidelines, 31 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY
PSYCH. 239 (1980).
155. As many as 20 to 25% of schizophrenics may receive no benefit from antipsychotic
medication. Physician D, supra note 112. See Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in its 20th Year,
181 SCIENCE 124 (1973); Van Putten, W) Do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31
ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Van Putten]; Van Putten & May,
Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacotherapy, 35 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 477
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Van Putten & May].
156. Bockoven & Solomon, Comparison of Two Five-Year Follow-Up Studies.- 1947 to 1952 and
1967 to 1972, 132 AM. J. PSYCH. 796 (1975); Carpenter, McGlashin & Strauss, The Treatment of
Acute Schizophrenia Without Drugs." An lnvestigation of Some Current Assumptions, 134 AM. J. PSYCH.
14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter]; Evans, PremorbidAdjustment, Phenothiazine Treatment, and
Remission in Acute Schizophrenics, 27 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 486 (1972); Van Kammen,
MAO Activity, CSFAmine Metabolites, and Drug-Free Improvement in Schizophrenia, 135 AM. J. PSYCH.
567 (1978); Van Putten, supra note 155; R. Warner & T. Yeager, Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment: A Medical Perspective, at 6 (Apr. 4, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at Mental
Health and the Law: A Symposium, Boulder, Colorado).
As many as 30% of psychotic patients spontaneously remit within a few days in an appro-
priate milieu. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION
wide therapeutic index157 and consequently a great margin of safety,158 they
are responsible for a number of side effects,' 59 one of which may be perma-
nent.
When patients are first treated with antipsychotic medication, they may
experience any of several short-term side effects, including drowsiness, dry
mouth, dizziness, nausea, and blurred vision. 160 These usually last no more
than two weeks. 16 1 Patients may also experience confusion and lethargy. '
6 2
A second category of side effects is the extrapyramidal or neuromuscu-
lar syndromes resulting from the drug's effects on the central nervous sys-
tem. 163 One extrapyramidal effect is Parkinsonism, the symptoms of which
include coarse tremor, shuffling gait, drooling, and rigidity.' 64  Ex-
trapyramidal side effects also include dystonias--uncoordinated body
spasms, including spasm of neck muscles, rigidity of the back muscles, swal-
lowing difficulties, and protrusion of the tongue. 165  Another ex-
trapyramidal effect is akathisia-motor restlessness characterized by feelings
of not being able to calm oneself ranging from inner disquiet to inability to
sit or lie quietly to insomnia.166 Anti-Parkinsonism (anticholinergic) drugs
used to counteract extrapyramidal side effects 167 may produce blurred vi-
sion, dry mouth, nausea, and nervousness.'68
157. The therapeutic index indicates the range between a therapeutic dose and a toxic dose
of medication. The greater the therapeutic index, the safer the drug and the lower its potential
toxicity at therapeutic doses. See Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 73, 79-80; Lipton &
Burnett, supra note 18, at 336.
158. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862.
159. See Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 337, for a listing of the nature and frequency of
adverse reactions to various types of antipsychotic medications.
160. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1634; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 338; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203.
161. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203.
162. Interview with Physician E. Physician E is the staff psychiatrist in charge of a division
of a large residential treatment center. The patients on his ward are acutely mentally ill. He
has encountered some patients who have refused medication, but his policy is to wait and try to
talk the patients into taking medication voluntarily. He has not gone to court. The patients on
his ward remain a maximum of three weeks; if they still need treatment they are transferred to
another ward.
163. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203. Both the amelioration of symptoms of psychosis and
the extrapyramidal side effects result from the same pharmacologic action on the postsynaptic
dopamine receptors. The drugs' blockade of receptors in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system
produces the antipsychotic properties and the blockage of receptors in the striatonigral
dopaminergic system is followed by the extrapyramidal symptoms. Melmon & Morrelli, supra
note 101, at 860. Approximately 30% of patients on sedative phenothiazines or thioxanthenes
and more than 50% of patients on other antipsychotic medications will suffer from ex-
trapyramidal syndromes. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 336, 338.
164. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 893; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
102, at 1634; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1203; Plotkin, supra note 71, at 475. Other symptoms of
Parkinsonism include pinrolling motion, plastic rigidity, or "cog wheeling," characterized by
stiffness of the skeletal muscles interrupted by lapses at the rate of three to seven cycles per
second; akinesia, which involves difficulty in initiating movements or modifying ongoing motor
activity; and mask-like face. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 893; Plotkin, supra note 71,
at 475.
165. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1634; DuBose, supra note 53, at
1203.
166. Physician D, supra note 112; MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 50.
167. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 863. One anti-Parkinsonism drug commonly
used is Cogentin. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1149.
168. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 864; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note
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A serious and possibly permanent side effect of antipsychotic medica-
tions is tardive dyskinesia.169 This syndrome is characterized by rhythmical
involuntary movements of the tongue, face, mouth, or jaw (including protru-
sion of the tongue, puffing of the cheeks, puckering of the mouth, and chew-
ing movements), and involuntary movements of the extremities.'
70 Most, if
not all, cases of tardive dyskinesia are preceded by the Parkinsonism syn-
drome.' 7 1 Ironically, however, the anticholinergic medications used to
counteract Parkinsonism and other extrapyramidal side effects are not only
ineffective against tardive dyskinesia, but often unmask latent dyskinesias
and may exacerbate existing ones.172 In addition, though the long-term use
of high dosage antipsychotic medications is the cause of tardive dyskinesia,
paradoxically, the symptoms are often not observed until drug usage is dis-
continued. Because sudden withdrawal of antipsychotic medications may
bring out latent syndromes, the most effective treatment to ameliorate the
symptoms of tardive dyskinesia is to increase the present dosage or to
readminister antipsychotic medication. 173 Although recent research has in-
dicated that lecithin may be used to ameliorate the symptoms of tardive
dyskinesia, 174 at present, no reliably effective treatment has been devel-
oped. '
75
Other serious side effects of antipsychotic medications include skin and
eye changes, liver damage, and agranulocytosis. The skin may become sensi-
tive to sunlight and turn gray, blue, or purple upon exposure to the sun.
102, at 1149. Anticholinergic drugs may produce mental confusion and excitement with large
doses. Mental symptoms may be intensified and visual hallucinations may occur. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1149. This group of drugs may also unmask or aggravate
tardive dyskinesia. Id. See text accompanying notes 169-75 tnfra.
169. Although there is no question that prolonged administration of high dosages of anti-
psychotic drugs contributes to the onset of tardive dyskinesia, the actual cause is not known. It
has been suggested that antipsychotic drugs cause hypersensitivity of, or damage to, receptors
or neurons in the striatonigral dopaminergic system in the brain. The risk of tardive dyskinesia
increases with age and length of use of medication. More women than men are likely to develop
the syndrome. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 102, at 1615; Opler,supra note 154, at 240; Plotkin,supra note 71, at 477. See Lipton
& Burnett, supra note 18, at 339-41.
170. These movements may also involve the diaphram, esophagus, and trunk. Melmon &
Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1615; Opler,
supra note 154, at 240.
171. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865. Fine vermicular (wormlike) movements of
the tongue may be an early sign of the onset of the syndrome. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 113, at 1684; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1103.
172. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 340.
173. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865; Opler, supra note 154, at 240.
174. Gelenberg, Chohne and Lecithin in the Treatment of Tardte Dyskinesia: Preliminary Results
from a Pilot Study, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 772 (1979); Neurotransmitter Precursors May Allay Neurologic
Diseases, 8 CLINICAL PSYCH. NEWS 27 (1980).
175. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866; Opler, supra note 154, at 240. One recom-
mended course of treatment at present is to eliminate or reduce anticholinergic medication as
soon as possible and to reduce the dose of antipsychotic medication slowly, trying to strike a
balance between improvement in the psychosis and amelioration of the abnormal movements.
Melmon & Morrelli,supra note 101, at 864-65. Another recommended course of treatment is to
periodically withdraw antipsychotic medications so that latent tardive dyskinesia may be dis-
covered. Some patients may do as well without medication (see text accompanying note 155
supra), and withdrawal of medication in some cases has lead to reversal of the symptoms of
tardive dyskinesia and often complete remission. Opler, supra note 154, at 242.
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Fine particles may appear in the lens and cornea of the eye. 176 Pigmentary
retinopathy, characterized by diminution of visual acuity, brownish coloring
of vision, and impairment of night vision may also occur. 17 7 Fatty changes
in the liver may result in chronic jaundice.' 78 Agranulocytosis, which in-
volves a precipitate disappearance of white blood cells, 179 is potentially fatal
because of the risk of immediate infection. 18 0 It is most often associated with
the administration of drugs in high dosages.' This side effect is now less
common, at least in part, because of increased usage of lower dosage, higher
potency drugs, from the use of which it is virtually unknown. 182 Finally,
there have been reports of sudden, unexplained deaths of hospitalized
psychotic patients receiving antipsychotic medications,' 8 3 but at present
there is insufficient evidence to establish a relationship between the deaths
and the administration of psychotropic medication.'
84
D. Schizoafctive disorder
Schizoaffective disorder is characterized by a mixture of schizophrenic
symptoms and altered affect, either depression or excitement. If depression
is the affect presented, the disorder is not easily distinguished from psychotic
depression. If the patient is excited, the disorder resembles the manic phase
of manic-depressive disorders.' 5 Chlorpromazine is more effective for high-
ly agitated schizoaffective patients,' 86 and lithium carbonate and chlor-
promazine are equally effective for mildly agitated patients. '
7
E. Misdagnosis and drug treatment
A number of studies have shown that the diagnostic reliability of psy-
chiatric disorders is poor.'8 One commentator concluded that while the
176. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1527; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 339; DuBose, supra note 53, at 1204.
177. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1526.
178. Id. at 857.
179. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1204.
180. Id.; Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 865. Agranulocytosis usually appears
within the first six weeks of treatment and is fatal in 30% or more of the cases. DuBose, supra
note 53, at 1205. Symptoms may also include ulcerative lesions of the throat and other mucous
membranes, of the gastrointestinal tract, and of the skin. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note
113, at 48.
181. For example, chlorpromazine and thioridazine. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at
865; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 339.
182. For example, haldoperal, fluphenazine, and tioxene. Such drugs require low dosages
to achieve the same effect. See note 150 supra.
183. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1615; Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 339.
184. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1676; Physician C, supra note 104;
Interview with Physician F. Physician F, a psychiatrist, is the medical director of the adult
psychiatric division of a large residential treatment center. He has participated in a number of
medication hearings.
Several patients have shown sudden flare-ups of psychotic behavior patterns shortly before
death. Previous brain damage or seizures may have been predisposing factors. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1676.
185. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 866.
186. Id.
187. Id.; Opler, supra note 154, at 241.
188. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychia y and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in he Court-
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reliability of the diagnoses of organic disorders is fairly high, the reliability of
diagnoses of functional disorders is only about fifty percent.18 9 Contributing
to the problems of diagnosing mental illness are the facts that symptoms
overlap between diagnostic categories, discrimination among diagnostic cat-
egories is unclear, and within each category a wide variety of symptoms ex-
ists. The manic phase of manic-depressive disorder resembles some forms of
schizophrenia,' 90 while the depressive phase is at first often indistinguishable
from depression.' 9 ' Although the manic patient may respond to anti-
psychotic medications typically prescribed for schizophrenia, better long-
term control of the manic phase results from treatment with lithium.' 92 Per-
sons diagnosed as having schizoaffective disorder may in fact have manic-
depressive illness. 193 Depression may be masked with the patient having no
complaints of feeling sad or "blue."' 194 A large number of patients do not fit
neatly into any diagnostic niche.195 As a result of the diagnostic complexi-
ties, there is some feeling that the current proclivity is to make too rapid
diagnoses followed by too narrowly derived treatment decisions, particularly
regarding drug therapy.1
96
The problem of misdiagnosis is compounded by the fact that drugs may
bring out undesired symptoms. Antidepressants can exacerbate psychoses'
97
and activate latent schizophrenia symptoms. 19a If antidepressant medication
is given to manic-depressive patients, it may cause symptoms of the manic
phase to occur.199 If phenothiazenes, the most frequently used class of anti-
psychotic medication, are given to nonpsychotic patients, dysphoria re-
sults.20°  Dysphoria is characterized by disquiet, restlessness, and malaise.20 I
Misdiagnosis is particularly critical in the elderly, 202 who often have
room, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974); Schwartz, supra note 66, at 809; Forced Drug Medication, supra
note 71, at 113.
189. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 188, at 699-708. The studies generally compared the diag-
nosis reached by two or more psychiatrists, and found that half the time they differed.
190. Physician A, supra note 8; Carpenter & Strauss, supra note 139, at 292. There has been
a tendency in America to diagnose schizophrenia more often than in Europe. Physician A, supra
note 8; Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.
191. Physician C, supra note 104; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 357. One follow-up study of
patients diagnosed as having unipolar depression found that 18% in fact had bipolar depression
(manic-depressive disorder).
192. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 331.
193. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 359.
194. Id.
195. Carpenter & Strauss, supra note 139, at 292.
196. Id. at 317.
197. Katz, Cole & Lowery, Studies of the Diagnostic Process. The Influence of Symptom Perception,
Past Experience, and Ethnic Background on Diagnostic Decisions, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 937 (1969). An-
tidepressants can exacerbate psychosis. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 858.
Attorney A reported that four of his clients complained of bizarre and frightening perceptual
changes-in effect, being made crazier-after being medicated. Attorney A conducts a private
practice primarily in the area of family law. His mental health clients have come through both
court appointments and his regular practice. He is a member of the Mental Disabilities Com-
mittee of the Colorado Bar Association.
198. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, supra note 102, at 1016.
199. Id.
200. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 862. Widespread use of antipsychotic medica-
tion without evidence of psychosis is potentially dangerous. Opler, supra note 154, at 243.
201. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 458.
202. Physician D, supra note 112; Interview with Attorney B. Attorney B is in private prac-
[Vol. 58:3
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION
paradoxic reactions to medications; for example, sedatives may produce agi-
tation.2 0 3 Considering the variety of potential side effects of medications
used in the treatment of mental illness and the possibility of misdiagnosis,
refusal of medication by mental patients may be founded on very objective
bases.
20 4
III. COLORADO STATUTE AND REGULATIONS ON CARE AND
TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
The Colorado statute regulating the care and treatment of the mentally
ill 20 5 has codified much of the case law regarding patients' rights. The pur-
poses underlying the statute are:
(a) To secure for each person who may be mentally ill such care
and treatment as will be suited to the needs of the person and to
insure that such care and treatment are skillfully and humanely
administered;
(b) To deprive a person of his liberty for purposes of treatment or
care only when less restrictive alternatives are unavailable and only
when his safety or the safety of others is endangered;
(c) To provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity,
and other secure treatment and care for mental illness;
(d) To encourage the use of voluntary rather than coercive meas-
ures to secure treatment and care for mental illness.
20 6
The statute provides that a person may be detained on an emergency
basis for evaluation or treatment or certified for care and treatment only if
he or she is an imminent danger to himself or herself or others, or is gravely
disabled. 20 7 A person is gravely disabled if "as a result of mental illness, he is
unable to take care of his basic personal needs or is making irrational or
grossly irresponsible decisions concerning his person and lacks the capacity
to understand this is so."
'20 8
A person can be detained for evaluation and treatment on an emer-
gency basis for only seventy-two hours.209 If at the end of that period the
person still meets the criteria for certification, he may be certified by court
order for short-term treatment of no longer than three months' duration.
210
The certification and requests for treatment on an outpatient basis must be
tice and has had much experience in the area of mental health law. He serves on the Mental
Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and on the Advisory Committee on
Rules and Regulations of the Division of Mental Health, Department of Institutions.
Particular care must be taken in prescribing for older persons drugs whose side effects in-
clude the lowering of blood pressure; e.g., tricyclic antidepressants. See note 132 supra.
203. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 870.
204. Se text accompanying notes 275-85 z 7fta.
205. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 27-10-101 to -129 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
206. Id. § 27-10-101 (1973).
207. Id. § 27-10-105(1)(a) (Supp. 1979).
208. Id. § 27-10-102(5) (Supp. 1979). A person taken into custody on an emergency basis
cannot be detained in a jail, lock up, or other place used for the confinement of persons charged
or convicted of penal offenses unless no other place or confinement for treatment and evaluation
is available. In that event, a person may be held for only 24 hours and must be held separately
from persons charged with or convicted of penal offenses. Id. § 27-10-105(1.1) (Supp. 1979).
209. Id. § 27-10-105(1) (Supp. 1979).
210. Id. § 27-10-107 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
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reviewed by a court if at any time during the three-month period the patient
or his attorney so petitions the court. 2 1 1 At the end of three months, the
certification may be extended by court order for an additional three months
if the person's condition so warrants.
2 12
In the event the person is still an imminent danger to himself or others
or gravely disabled and has received short-term treatment for five consecu-
tive months, he may be certified for long-term treatment for a period of no
longer than six months. 21 3 A hearing on long-term certification before either
the court or a jury is mandatory if requested by the patient or his attor-
ney.2 14 Long-term certifications may be extended for consecutive periods of
up to six months each thereafter.2 1 5 -Both short- and long-term certifications
must be terminated as soon as the professional in charge of the patient's
treatment determines that the patient has received sufficient benefit from
such treatment to warrant release.
216
Persons detained for evaluation or treatment have a right to receive
medical and psychiatric care and treatment suited to meet their individual
needs in the least restrictive environment possible. 21 7 They may petition the
court for a less restrictive setting within or without the treatment facility,
and if they are receiving no treatment, they may petition the court for re-
lease. 2 18 Consent must be given for specific therapies and major medical
treatment in the nature of surgery. 2 19 Specific therapies for which consent
must be given are surgery, electroshock treatment, 220 and the use of psychi-
atric drugs in extraordinarily large doses. 221 The consent to their adminis-
tration must be informed, 2 22 freely given, in writing, and signed by the
211. Id. § 27-10-107(6) (Supp. 1979). The hearing must be held within ten days of the
court's receipt of the petition. Id. An attorney must be appointed for every person certified for
short-term treatment. Id. § 27-10-107(5) (Supp. 1979).
212. Id. § 27-10-108 (1973). At the request of the patient or his attorney, a hearing is also
mandatory for extention of certification. Id.
213. Id. § 27-10-109 (1973).
214. Id. § 27-10-109(3) (1973). Requests for jury trials must be filed with the court within
ten days after the receipt of the petition by the patient or his attorney. Id.
215. Id. § 27-10-109(5) (Supp. 1979). Hearings are again mandatory, if requested.
216. Id. § 27-10-110 (Supp. 1979). The professional person must notify the court within five
days of such termination.
217. Id. § 27-10-116(1)(a) (Supp. 1979). See Department of Institutions, Care and Treat-
ment of Mentally Ill, Rules and Regulations, 2 C.C.R. 502-1 § II, C. (effective May 30, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Regulations]. "[Tihe patient shall enjoy the maximum amount of
freedom consistent with his/her clinical needs .. " Id.
218. CoIo. REv. STAT. § 27-10-116(i)(b) (Supp. 1979).
219. Id. § 27-10-116(2)(a) (1973). 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII. See CoLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 27-10-117, -119, -120 (1973), regarding rights and privileges of patients while they are
committed to institutions.
220. See note 133, szpra.
221. 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII.A.
222. An informed consent must be preceded by the following:
1. A fair explanation of the proposed specific therapy, including identification of its
experimental elements, if any;
2. the probable consequences if the treatment is not permitted to proceed;
3. the availability of appropriate alternative treatment, if any;
4. an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the specific therapy;
5. an instruction that the patient or other person giving consent is free to withdraw
his/her consent and discontinue therapy at any time.
1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § VII.D. 1.
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patient or his or her legal guardian. 223
On July 30, 1979, the Department of Institutions adopted regulations
on the right to refuse medication. 224 Where prescription medications are to
be a part of the treatment program, the patient or his legal guardian must be
informed of the reasons for prescribing the medication, the probable conse-
quences of not taking the medication, the expected benefits of the medica-
tion, the common side effects associated with its use, if any, and the major
risks, if any.225 The physician must make a reasonable attempt to obtain
voluntary acceptance of the medication by the patient and must be available
to answer inquiries regarding the medication. In addition, the patient must
be informed that he may withdraw agreement to take the medication at any
time. If after this procedure the patient refuses to accept medication, then
appropriate treatment alternatives must be presented to the patient.
226
Under nonemergency conditions, the 1979 regulations provided that if
the patient refused medication, and the physician concluded that medica-
tion was essential for the patient's treatment, a review hearing was to be
conducted by the facility's medical director or his designee. 22 7 The review
hearing amounted to a quasi-judicial proceeding in which the patient's at-
torney could be present; the patient could present evidence, question wit-
nesses, and have a physician testify on his own behalf; and written findings
and conclusions were to be issued by the presiding physician. 228 The proce-
dure was followed reluctantly, if at all, for several reasons. Physicians, be-
lieving their job was to treat patients, did not want to be placed in the role of
a judge.22 9 One facility, which hired an outside psychiatrist to preside over
medication hearings, found this method unsatisfactory because of the costs
involved in paying the psychiatrist and providing space and staff for him. In
addition, attorneys raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest because
the psychiatrist was paid by the institution attempting to medicate their cli-
ents involuntarily.230 This review procedure was overturned by the Colorado
Supreme Court in the Goedcke decision, 23 1 which ruled that a patient had
the right to refuse medication in nonemergency situations unless a compe-
tent tribunal first finds that the patient's illness "has so impaired his judg-
ment that he is incapable of participating in decisions affecting his
health.232
Following the Goedecke decision, the Division of Mental Health Advisory
223. Id. § VII.B. 1.
224. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.
225. Id. § VIII.A.I.
226. Id. §§ VIII.A.2., to -.5.
227. Id. § VIII.B.2.a.ii. Prior to the issuance of these regulations, the decision to medicate
in spite of the patient's refusal was made upon consultation with other physicians. Physician B,
supra note 47; Interview with Physician G. Physician G is a psychiatrist who is the medical
director of a large residential treatment center. He has served in this capacity throughout the
time that the Colorado regulations regarding the right to refuse treatment have been in effect.
228. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.B.2.a.ii.
229. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician C, supra note 104.
230. Physician A, supra note 8.
231. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
232. Id. at 125.
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Board for Service Standards and Regulations 233 proposed new regulations
which were adopted on July 16, 1980,234 after public hearings and numerous
meetings. All references to administration of medication over the objections
of the patient in nonemergency situations were deleted. Under the current
regulations, medication may be administered over the objection of a patient
only if an emergency exists. 235 Such an emergency exists only if one of the
three conditions set forth in the regulations is met:
i. The patient is determined to be in imminent danger of hurting
herself/himself or others as evidenced by symptoms which have in
the past reliably predicted imminent dangerousness in the particu-
lar patient or by a recent overt act, including but not limited to a
credible threat of bodily harm, an assault on another person, or
self-destructive behavior.
ii. The patient's life is in imminent danger due to toxicity arising
from the patient's use or abuse of another medication, drug, or
other substance.
iii. The patient's life is in imminent danger because of a severely
debilitated condition.
236
The patient's condition is to be evaluated every twenty-four hours to deter-
mine if the emergency condition still exists. 23 7 If the attending physician
determines that the emergency condition continues and that medication is
indicated beyond seventy-two hours, the facility must request a court hear-
ing for an order to administer the medication, 238 and the physician must
obtain a concurring consultation with another physician. 239 Medication
cannot be administered over a patient's lack of consent for longer than ten
days without a court order.240 The patient must be notified promptly of the
right to contact an attorney or a court of competent jurisdiction.2 4 1 The
treating facility must help the patient contact the attorney or the court if
necessary to effectively exercise these rights.
242
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION
The refusal of medication has affected the mental health treatment sys-
tem in many ways. A very direct effect has been apparent on the wards in
residential treatment centers. One aim of inpatient treatment is to structure
233. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-129 (1973).
234. Department of Institutions, Care and Treatment of Mentally I11, Rules and Regula-
tions, 2 C.C.R. 502-1 (effective July 16, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as 1980 Regulations].
235. Id. § VIII.B.I.A.
The facts supporting the emergency must be detailed in the patient's chart initially and
every 24 hours so long as the emergency continues to exist. Id. § VII.B.3.
236. 1979 Regulations, supra note 7, § VIII.B.l.b.
237. Id. § VIII.B.I.a.
238. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.I.c. 1. The 1979 regulations had provided
that medication could be administered on an emergency basis for only 72 hours. 1979 Regula-
tions, supra note 7, § VIII.B.l.d.
239. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.I.c. If the consultation cannot be obtained
within the initial 72 hours of involuntary administration of medication, no medication can be
administered until a concurring consultation is documented in the patient's chart. Id.
240. Id. § VIII.B.I.d.
241. Id. § VIII.B.2.
242. Id.
[Vol. 58:3
1981] RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICA TION
the patient's environment so that it will be as constructive a force as possible
toward the achievement of treatment objectives. 243 The therapeutic milieu
is disrupted in several ways by patients who refuse medication. 244 First, the
outward refusal of medication undermines the good will of other patients on
the ward.245 Not only do refusing patients try to convince other patients not
to take their medications, but the mere fact of their refusal is sometimes
contagious.
246
Patients refusing medications may become disruptive, out of control, or
violent.247 Their disturbances may make it impossible to treat others. 248 In
addition, when violence and other uncontrollable behavior occurs on the
243. Cameron, NonmedicalJudgment of Medzcal Malters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716, 731 (1969).
244. Attorney A, supra note 197. See Ford, supra note 38, at 337.
245. Physician G, supra note 227.
246. Interview with Psychiatric Nurse A. Psychiatric Nurse A has a master's degree in psy-
chiatric nursing. She is the head nurse and administrator of the psychiatric ward of a private
hospital. The ward has a capacity of up to 33 patients, both neurotic and psychotic, with both
functional and organic illnesses. The average length of stay is two weeks. About an eighth of
the patients are involuntary and paid for by the state on a contract basis with a mental health
center. This hospital has for some time been keeping detailed documentation of side effects and
has closely monitored the use of medication.
247. Id.; Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Interview with Attorney C;
Interview with Psychiatric Nurse B.
Attorney C specializes in mental health law. His clients come primarily through court
appointments. He has participated in four medication hearings, and serves both on the Mental
Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and on the Advisory Committee on
Rules and Regulations, Division of Mental Health, Department of Institutions.
Psychiatric Nurse B has earned a Ph.D. in psychiatric nursing, has taught that subject, and
has worked in the mental health systems of three states. She is the director of nursing at a
residential treatment hospital which has a capacity of 70 inpatients.
An extreme example of the chaos that can result from the refusal of treatment was summa-
rized in a brief prepared by the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society in response to a temporary
restraining order allowing patients in a state hospital to refuse treatment. Statements in quota-
tion marks are taken from hospital records:
"Tension seems to fill the air at the Austin Unit twenty-four hours a day." One
wing has been destroyed by fire, set by a patient. One female patient attempted to
burn a staff member, to choke a patient, and to strangle herself with a ripped dress.
She smashed a window, threatened to kill several staff members, attacked, kicked, and
spat at them. At another time she was "screaming, threatening, deluded, beat staff,
grabs them, incited another disturbed patient to violence by inviting him to her bed
and defying staff to deal with him. This other patient becomes so threatening that the
night staff sent Dr. G. a letter signed by all informing him that they would not and
could not work under these conditions."
Another female Austin Unit patient punched a social worker and several patients,
cut herself with fliptops, and "gouged her face with her fingernails until she bled; this
continued almost daily through the month of June." A schizophrenic male patient
who has refused medication since the grant of the restraining order has had sexual
intercourse with at least three different patients who are either retarded or are severely
and chronically regressed. He has also broken a window, kicked a patient, and
grabbed and threatened two female staff members. The incidence of assaultive behav-
ior by Austin patients has also increased as the administration of medication has de-
clined in deference to their wishes.
Patients in the May Unit have experienced similar problems. One woman, while
refusing medication, became psychotic and left the hospital in anger, lived on a door-
step without changing her clothes for two weeks, and was twice returned to the hospi-
tal by police, and twice set herself on fire in her room. In the May, as in Austin Unit,
"since the issuance of the temporary restraining order, tensions, threats, agitation and
acts of violence have increased."
Quoted in Stone, Legal and Ethical Developments, in DISORDERS OF SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME
571 (1979).
248. Stone, supra note 247, at 566.
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ward, patients become fearful, not only for their own safety but for their own
self-control. 249 In general, most patients do not want to be crazy or violent;
they want to be stopped before they get out of control. Indeed, one major
purpose of the therapeutic milieu is to provide structure and set limits in
order to help patients master their own impulsive behavior.
2 50
The relationships between patient and staff are also negatively affected
by out of control behavior resulting from a patient's refusal of medication.
Threats and violence are often directed at the staff.2 5 ' The staff in response
becomes fearful and angry, not only because they may be physically injured
and other patients endangered, but also because they are now much more
limited in their ability to deal with such out of control behavior as a result
of the new regulations regarding the right .to refuse medication. 252 There is
uncertainty as to when the emergency use of medication is allowed.2 53 It is
presently used only when a life-threatening situation arises and only after
violent behavior occurs.254 The use of restraints and seclusion, the abolition
of which has been advocated for some time, is now often the only method of
dealing with out of control behavior.25 5 For some patients, whose out of con-
249. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
250. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
251. Id; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
252. Physician F, supra note 184.
253. There are mixed feelings among mental health professionals about whether the 1980
regulations have clarified some of the confusion which existed both immediately after the imple-
mentation of the 1979 regulations and after the Goedecke decision. Some feel that the new regu-
lations have made working conditions easier. Physician B,supra note 47; Physician C,supra note
104; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Interview with Attorney D. Others feel the situation is
more confused. Physician D, supra note 112; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
Attorney D is an assistant county attorney responsible for mental health law, who works
with a community mental health center. Attorney D has participated in fifteen medication
hearings.
254. Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
Example /: A patient with a history of aggressive behavior, who had refused medication,
became increasingly agitated. Because of this and other behaviors, the staff knew that he would
become violent. The hospital, however, had a policy of not administering medication against a
patient's wishes unless there was a life-threatening emergency or the patient had demonstrated
through a recent act that he was dangerous to himself or others. As his condition deteriorated,
he was placed in seclusion. Some time later the staff heard a crash, and two members went to
the room in which the patient had been placed. The patient had tried to break a window by
throwing a chair through it. The patient then bashed one of the mental health workers and
threw the other across the room. The situation then was determined to be dangerous enough
for the administration of medication. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
Example 2: A woman who suffered from chronic schizophrenia, and who had been in and
out of the hospital many times, refused to take medication. Part of her behavior pattern was
throwing chairs. The hospital's policy was to administer medication against a patient's wishes
only if a life-threatening emergency arose. The woman had never hit another person with the
chairs she threw, so the situation was determined by the staff not to be life-threatening. After
she refused medication for a period of time and continued to throw chairs, her throwing arm
was placed in a restraint. Her condition eventually settled down to the point where she no
longer threw chairs, and the restraint was removed. She then began to remove her clothing
wherever she happened to be and would not keep it on. Her condition was not considered
serious enough to petition the court for a medication order. Physician D, supra note 112.
255. Physician B, supra note 47; Attorney A, supra note 197; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note
247.
Example 3: A large male, who was clearly out of control 'and potentially dangerous, was
brought to the psychiatric ward of a hospital from the emergency room. He refused to take
medication. The hospital's policy was to medicate only in a life-threatening emergency. The
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trol behavior can be compared to a child acting out to get attention, the
stopping of their actions by the use of physical restraint can have a salutary
effect, not only to prevent physical injury, but to help them to regain con-
trol.
2 56 The increased use of restraints and seclusion, however, is considered
by many to be a step backward in the treatment of mental illness.
25 7
The dynamics of the patient-staff relationship is also affected in other
ways. First, when assaultive behavior occurs, the staff has a tendency to iso-
late the patient. This may, in turn, provoke more acting-out behavior on the
part of the patient, which may result in more isolation on the part of the
staff, thus impeding therapeutic progress.2 58 Second, disruptive patients re-
quire an inordinate amount of staff time, resulting in less time available for
nondisruptive patients. 259 Third, part of the structure of the therapeutic
milieu is derived from the authority of the therapist. When this authority
and its attendant limit-setting ability are undermined, the structure is




patient was placed in four-point restraints for several days until his condition settled down, and
he was then released. Physician B, supra note 47.
Example 4: A young woman who was retarded was placed in a residential treatment center
through a community health center. She was paranoid and psychotic, but was not dangerous.
She refused to take medication. She repeatedly ran away from the hospital and continued to
refuse medication. She was first placed in leg shackles, but managed to leave the hospital.
Eventually, she was kept strapped to a chair. Interview with Psychiatric Nurse C. Psychiatric
Nurse C has a master's degree and has worked in several states. She is the head of the inpatient
team at a community mental health center. The team is in charge of patients both at a small
residential treatment unit and at a state psychiatric hospital.
State regulations provide that restraint and seclusion may be used only in an emergency
when a professional person determines that the patient is in imminent danger of hurting himself
or herself or others and treatment of the condition is possible only with the use of restraints or
seclusion. They may be used only when less restrictive means cannot produce the control neces-
sary to prevent harm to the patient or others, and only such restraint or seclusion as is reason-
ably necessary may be used. The patient may be secluded or restrained for no more than four
hours, unless upon examination by a professional person, an express order is given for a longer
period of restraint. The patient must be observed not less than every fifteen minutes during the
period of restraint or seclusion. Finally, there must be an examination of the patient and new
authorization for seclusion every 24 hours. 1978 Regulations, supra note 217, § II.E. See Brakel
& Rock, supra note 11, at 158-61.
256. Physician C, supra note 104.
Hearings on the right to refuse treatment are not limited to the right to refuse medication.
A hearing was held in which two psychiatrists testified that the extended use of four-point re-
straints was the most appropriate treatment for a patient who did not respond to medication.
The patient had refused the use of physicial restraints. Interview with Judge A. Judge A is a
district court judge who presides over a civil division. He hears most of the mental health cases
in his district, and has presided over some fifteen medication hearings.
257. Physician B, supra note 47; Attorney A, supra note 197; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note
246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Brakel & Rock, supra note 11, at 158-6 1.
One physician stated that he felt the use of physicial restraints was inhumane. Physician
D, supra note 112. Another physician felt that in some cases the use of medical restraint through
medication was less intrusive than the use of physical restraint. He cited the example of a very
fearful and paranoid patient, among whose delusions were that someone was out to kill him.
He had refused medication and was strapped in a chair. Being placed in restraints aroused in
him abject terror, for he felt he was trapped and defenseless against his imagined enemy. Physi-
cian F, supra note 184.
258. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
259. Physician G, supra note 227.
260. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
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Patients refuse medication for three primary reasons. The first is be-
cause of their illness. They may be paranoid and suspect that the medica-
tion is poison 26 1 or ascribe some secret and unfriendly meaning to the
therapeutic maneuvers of the therapist. 262 The patient's belief that he or
she is not ill is prominent in psychosis.
263 Mental illness is stigmatizing,
264
and patients who do not want to be labeled mentally ill may refuse the medi-
cation which would force them to admit that they are ill. 265 Manic patients
and grandiose schizophrenics are often very euphoric or ecstatic and refuse
medication because they do not want the elation they feel to be dispelled.
266
Dysphoric or depressed patients are less likely to refuse; 26 7 however, some
depressed patients who are suicidal and want to die will refuse treatment
because medication will enable them to live268 and other depressed patients
may feel they are not worthy of treatment. Patients may not want to be
treated because they are unwilling to surrender the positive, defensive adap-
tations of their illness. 269 They may not want to reestablish contact with
reality 2 70 because they fear some intolerable condition which exists in real-
ity. Improvement in the patient's mental illness might lead to reality, thus
forcing the patient to confront it. 2 7 ' One physician estimated that nine out
of ten patients who refuse medication do so because of their illness.
272
A second reason for drug refusal relates to the patient-therapist rela-
tionship. There may be tension in the relationship, excessive passivity on the
261. Physician F, supra note 184; Physician G, supra note 227; Melmon & Morrelli, supra
note 101, at 118; Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study ofPsychiatrt Inpatients, 137 AM. J.
PSYCH. 340 (1980); Van Putten, supra note 155, at 67.
Example 5: A woman, 55-years-old and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, had been
periodically violent for five years. She suffered from the delusion that members of her family
had been replaced by FBI agents who looked exactly like the members of her family. She was in
the hospital for eight weeks, at a cost of $150.00 per day, before a petition for a medication
order was filed on her behalf. Medication was ordered, and she was out of the hospital in seven
days after receiving medication. Physician D, supra note 112.
262. Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 118.
263. Id.; Physician A, supra note 8; Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68; Forced Drug Medication,
supra note 71, at 261 n.84.
This attitude was recognized by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975): "It is universally recognized as fundamental to
effective therapy that the patient acknowledge his illness and cooperate with those attempting
to give treatment; yet the failure of a large proportion of mentally ill persons to do so is a
common phenomenon."
264. Physician A, supra note 8. See D. RUBIN, ECONOMICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE
LAW 104 (1978).
265. Physician A, supra note 8; A. BECK, supra note 108, at 381.
266. Physician A, supra note 8. One physician feels that reducing some grandiose states by
medication may not be in the best interest of the patient. He cited the example of one schizo-
phrenic who believed that he had received a message from God to spread God's word. The
patient refused medication on the basis of his belief that the medication would interfere with his
direct communication with God. The physician decided against attempting to obtain a court
order for medication because he could not state absolutely in this case that the administration of
medication would be in his best professional judgment. Id.
267. Id.
268. Physician C, supra note 104; Physician F, supra note 184.
269. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 340.
270. Id.
271. Physician C, supra note 104.
272. Physician F, supra note 184.
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part of the therapist, or lack of feedback from the therapist. 273 There may
be negativistic or other power struggles going on between the patient and the
physician or staff.
2 7 4
Drug side effects constitute a third reason for refusal of medication. 2 75
Some patients refuse medication because of dysphoric response.2 76 One
study found that an early dysphoric response indicates that the medication
will have no long-term beneficial effect. 2 77 Such physiologic responses as
sedative or extrapyramidal side effects may produce panic reactions and fur-
ther psychotic deterioration. In addition, the extrapyramidal side effects
may often be very stressful.27 8 "[M]ost drug reluctant patients find life with
chronic EPI [extrapyramidal side effects] unbearable. '2 79 One study found a
strong correlation between hostile, paranoid schizophrenia, extrapyramidal
side effects, and drug reluctance.
280
Patients who refuse medication may not do so consistently. Some pa-
tients may refuse medication one day and accept it the next. 2 ' Others refuse
medication infrequently with no apparent pattern.2 8 2 Some refuse medica-
tion as a habitual response to stress, but usually resume taking medication at
273. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 341.
274. Id. at 340; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Van Put-
ten, supra note 155, at 68.
275. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 340, 342-43.
Example 6: A large man, who had been in and out of hospitals many times over a period of
years, refused medication because he said it would make him seem unfriendly, would inhibit
him, and would make him unable to talk as well. In addition, he had suffered some muscle
paralysis seven years earlier for two weeks, the only time he had experienced that side effect. He
was dangerous and potentially violent. During a court hearing, he testified only as to the poten-
tial side effects and recognized none of the benefits. Medication was ordered. Attorney D, supra
note 253.
Example 7: A 67-year-old depressed woman, who refused medication periodically during
her hospitalization, stated that she believed the staff was giving her incorrect medication, the
effect of which was making her confused. In fact, blood tests indicated that the amount of
antidepressants in her system was at a very toxic level. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at
242-43. See also text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
276. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 243; Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68; Van
Putten & May, supra note 155, at 479. Patients may complain that they feel miserable. See text
accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
277. Van Putten & May, supra note 155, at 480.
278. Van Putten, supra note 155, at 68.
279. Id. at 70.
Example 8: A.woman, so uncommunicative as to be almost mute, was a patient in a hospi-
tal which has a very coercive atmosphere (patients are routinely placed in restraints upon their
arrival). She refused to take medication, and also would not sign a release to obtain background
information. Whenever the subject of medication or the reason for her hospitalization was dis-
cussed she would become totally unresponsive. The attorney appointed to represent her noticed
movements of her lips and tongue, indicating the possibility of tardive dyskinesia. The doctors
had done no testing for tardive dyskinesia and had not mentioned the syndrome or the lip and
tongue movements in their report to the court hearing a petition for medication. Her attorney
revealed the existence of the tongue and lip movements on cross examination. The court or-
dered medication, but stayed the implementation of the order for two weeks so that an in-
dependent examination could be made to evaluate the possible presence of tardive dyskinesia.
Attorney C, supra note 247. See text accompanying notes 169-75 supra.
280. Van Putten, supra note 155, at 70.
281. Physician A, supra note 8.
282. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 342.
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some time shortly after refusal. 28 3 It has been found that in these situations,
the patient's overall treatment has not been impaired and some positive ad-
vantages have resulted. 28 4 The group of patients about whom there is most
concern is comprised of those who refuse medications over a substantial pe-
riod of time in a manner which significantly interferes with the hospital's
ability to treat them. 285 These patients' situations bring out the essential
conflict between the right to refuse treatment and the philosophy of mental
health treatment today: These patients have a right to treatment, indeed the
statute mandates their treatment, but if they refuse treatment as is their
right, they cannot be treated.2 86 This dilemma applies particularly to nonvi-
olent, passive refusers, 287 the persons described as "harmlessly crazy, but suf-
fering greatly." 288  Unless after a time of attempted persuasion they
voluntarily take medication, these persons will remain unmedicated. Their
condition may stabilize, but for some, unless they receive medication to help
clear their thinking, no therapeutic progress can be made. There is nothing
in the statute or regulations that mandates against petitions for medication
being brought on their behalf. If their illness makes them incapable of par-
ticipating in decisions affecting their health, they meet the Goedecke criterion
to have a competent tribunal decide whether or not they can be medicated.
Petitions for nonemergency medication are not being brought, however. In-
stead there is a tendency to drop patients' certifications as soon as their con-
ditions become stabilized and return them to the community. 289 They are
simply not being treated. °
Although some mentally ill persons may remit spontaneously without
medication,2 9 ' many cannot begin to function effectively without drug ther-
apy; and they need more than medication to help them live in society. They
283. This response has been described as the dynamic equivalent of a child going on a
hunger strike to evoke certain responses from its mother. Id. at 344.
284. Id. at 345. See text accompanying notes 314-16 mnfta.
285. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 261, at 343-44.
286. "In situations of this type . . . the right to and the right to refuse treatment are essen-
tially antithetical rights because to enforce one is to fully destroy the other." Schoenfeld, Recent
Developments in the Law Concerning the M~enta4y Ill-"A Cornerstone Laid in Mud," 9 U. TOL. L. REV.
1, 16 (1977).
287. "The fact is that the great majority of hospitalized mental patients are too passive, too
silent, too fearful, too withdrawn [to be dangerous]." Deutsch, Statement, supra note 1, at 43.
Erample 9: A young woman in her 20's was extremely withdrawn and frightened. She was
not dangerous but spent the day walking aimlessly clinging to a stuffed rabbit. She refused
medication, and came under no criteria upon which medication could be administered without
her consent. Her condition gradually deteriorated. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
288. Physician E, supra note 162.
Example 10: A critically ill schizophrenic woman lived in a closet for the first six weeks of
her hospitalization. She would not bathe or eat except in the closet in the middle of the night.
Because she did not come under the emergency rules---she was no danger to herself or others--
medication could not be given without her consent. The psychiatrist eventually established an
alliance with her so that she voluntarily took medication. Within two weeks she was out of the
closet and began to function normally. Meanwhile, her hospitalization had cost $100 per day
plus the cost of the doctor. Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
289. Physician E, supra note 162; Physician F, supra note 184; Attorney A, supra note 197;
Redlich & Mollica, Oviennew: Ethical Issues in Contemporay Pschitr, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 125
(1976).
290. Physician G, supra note 227.
291. One authority has estimated that as many as 30% of psychotic patients will spontane-
ously remit within a few days in an appropriate milieu. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 330.
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need, at a minimum, social support if not social therapy, but they cannot
benefit from social therapy unless they receive medication. 292 It is the ethi-
cal duty of the medical profession to treat, but because therapists cannot
treat in this situation, they feel helpless and frustrated. 293 Even though a
violent patient may present more risk to the therapist, at least something can
be done under the emergency regulations.
Mental health professionals define emergency in a much narrower sense
than the regulations seem to allow. Some mental health facilities will ad-
minister medication on an emergency basis only if a life-threatening situa-
tion arises.294 Others will administer medication only after assaultive
behavior has occurred.2 95 The regulations, however, allow administration of
medication if "the patient is determined to be in imminent danger of hurting
herself/himself or others as evidenced by symptoms which have in the past
reliably predicted imminent dangerousness on the part of the patient.
'296
At only one institution are medications being given under the emergency
regulations before assaultive or. violent behavior occurs. In that instance,
medications are administered only if the present pattern of behavior, as
clearly documented in the past, has predictably indicated future aggression
or violence. 297 There has been a tendency to "save" the seventy-two hour
emergency medication until the condition of the patient deteriorates to the
point where he is totally out of control. 298 In addition, mental health profes-
sionals in the Denver metropolitan area are acting in the belief that there is
only one emergency medication period allowed per patient. At the Colorado
State Hospital in Pueblo, however, emergency medications are used when-
ever they are needed-if a patient is medicated, becomes better, and some
time later again meets the criteria for emergency medication, it will again be
used.
299
Some mental health professionals consider the ten-day limitation on the
emergency administration of medication without a court hearing 3° ° to be
totally arbitrary and unrelated to good medical practice. The ten-day limi-
tation in the 1980 regulations, however, is a considerable improvement over
the seventy-two hours allowed by the original 1979 regulations. 30 1 The re-
292. Attorney A, supra note 197.
293. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Ford, supra note 38, at 333;
Redlich & Mollica, supra note 289, at 132.
294. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Warner & Yeager, supra
note 156, at 3.
295. Physician D, supra note 112; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246; Psychiatric Nurse B,
supra note 247.
296. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § VIII.B.l.b.i.
297. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
298. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note
246.
299. Physician F, supra note 184; Interview with Attorney E. Attorney E is an assistant
county attorney responsible for mental health litigation in his county. He has filed six petitions
for medication. One petition has been heard. Four are awaiting hearings on motions to dismiss,
and one will be heard shortly.
300. Physician D, supra note 112.
301. Physician B, supra note 47; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246. In discussing the 72-
hour limitation on medication, one physician drew a parallel to the administration of medica-
tion for strep throat: After the patient takes the medication for 72 hours, the symptoms of strep
1981]
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quest for a court hearing must still be made within seventy-two hours after
the initial emergency administration of medication to a nonconsenting pa-
tient if the physician believes medication will be necessary beyond seventy-
two hours. The ten-day limitation merely allows continuation of the medi-
cation for more than seventy-two hours pending the court hearing. 30 2 The
extended time period, however, at least gives mental health professionals
more ability to work with the patient therapeutically. 30 3 Some nonconsent-
ing patients given medication on an emergency basis have become calmer
and more amenable to treatment and have continued taking medications
voluntarily before the expiration of the ten days, thus obviating the need for
a court hearing.
30 4
Two categories of patients are potential candidates for medication hear-
ings: nonconsenting patients who need emergency treatment for more than
seventy-two hours and persons who refuse medication but who do not meet
the criteria for administration of medication on an emergency basis. The
criteria used by mental health professionals to evaluate those patients for
whom court-ordered medication will be requested are even more stringent
than the criteria for emergency medication. As a consequence, petitions are
being filed for only the most seriously ill or dangerous patients. 30 5
The process of going to court to obtain medication may have a detri-
mental effect on the treatment of mental illness because of the delays in ob-
taining a court hearing. As long as two or three weeks have elapsed from the
filing of the petition for medication until the date of the hearing.30 6 If a
hearing cannot be set within ten days of the first administration of medica-
tion on an emergency basis, the medication must be discontinued at the ex-
piration of the ten-day limit until a court order is obtained. The patient's
condition may begin to deteriorate upon withdrawal. The judicial process
may also have a detrimental effect; if motions to dismiss are filed, they must
first be ruled upon before the hearing on the petition for medication takes
place. 30 7 The additional delay may have a further negative effect on the
throat may be gone, but the bacteria which cause the illness are still in the patient's system; thus
the usual practice is to administer medication for ten days because of the potential for very
serious complications.
302. 1980 Regulations, supra note 234, § B.l.c.
303. Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
304. Physician C, supra note 104; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
305. Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227. Doctors may bring petitions
for involuntary medication for only those patients whose cases they believe they can win. If the
doctors feel a medication order will not be granted, they will not file a petition. Physician A,
supra note 8; Attorney D, supra note 253.
306. Physician D, supra note 112; Attorney D, supra note 253. In one court, there has been
an average of seven days between the time a petition is filed and the time a hearing is held.
Recently, the time has been shortened. Attorney D, supra note 253. In another court, although
there were delays at first in scheduling a hearing on medication petitions, the court is attempt-
ing to hear them as soon as possible, and the delays have been shortened. Interview with Judge
C. Judge C is a probate judge and handles all mental health cases for the judicial district in
which his court is located. He has heard a dozen medication hearings.
307. One commentator suggested that "unnecessary delays [sic] in terminating psychotic
episodes is tantamount to 'playing with fire.' "ForcedDrug Medcattn,supra note 71, at 118 n.98.
Example //: A woman for whom a petition for medication had been filed submitted a
motion to dismiss. Between the filing of the motion and the hearing, the woman walked away
from the institution in which she was being treated. She went to her home, saw four photo-
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patient.
30 8
An additional consequence of going to court is the submission of the
physician-patient relationship to the adversarial process, which many physi-
cians feel is detrimental to the physician-patient relationship and impairs
the treatment of mental illness. 30 9 Many patients who refuse medication are
distrustful to begin with, and the adversarial process increases this distrust,
thus impeding the establishment of the mutual trust necessary for a thera-
peutic alliance. 3 10 Having the court make the decision may diminish the
patient's respect for the physician's judgment 3 1 and reduce his or her au-
thority.
3 12
Positive effects may also result from both the attempt to persuade the
patient to voluntarily accept the medication and the process of going to
court. By discussing court procedures with the patient, the physician can
improve the patient's understanding of that procedure. 3 13 Throughout the
discussions, time is being spent with the patient which may lead toward the
building of a positive relationship and therapeutic alliance, 3 14 with the even-
tual development of mutual trust necessary for long-term success in mental
health treatment. 3t 5 The patient's role in the treatment decision is likely to
lead to an increased sense of self worth and power.3 16 Stipulations may be
graphs which were normally in her living room, and because of her delusional system, thought
they had been put there to poison her. She burned them in the middle of her living room floor,
the fire spread, and the inside of her house was gutted. An order for medication was subse-
quently entered. Once she was placed on medication, she rapidly improved. Physician F, supra
note 184; Attorney E, supra note 299.
308. Example 12: A woman, who had many previous hospital admissions, refused medica-
tion. During previous admissions, she had compensated immediately upon taking medication.
She was overtly psychotic and refused to eat. Among her delusions was that she had to purify
her system by drinking salt water. She had been confined for a year without medication and
had been through three jury trials, on the issue of certification, two of which had ended in
mistrials. Because persons can be medicated involuntarily only if they are certified for treat-
ment, she had not been medicated on an emergency basis. If she had been placed on medica-
tion, it is very likely in the light of her previous history that she would have been released from
the hospital in a very short time. Physician F, supra note 184.
309. One physician feels that going to court may result in the physician's being perceived by
the patient as being either powerless or cruel. Physician G, supra note 227.
310. Id.; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247. See also Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at
1. One attorney, however, questioned how much of a relationship existed initially. Involun-
tary patients are probably part of the adversary process already, since they have been certified
by court order as being dangerous or gravely disabled. Prior to that certification, a hearing was
held. Attorney A, supra note 197. In addition, it is the patient, through his refusal, who makes
the issue of medication an adversary one. Physician F, supra note 184.
311. Physician G, supra note 227. Physician G related that prior to the time the rules re-
garding the right to refuse medication were promulgated, if a patient was medicated against his
will, the patient's later response was that "I didn't know how bad off I was." In Physician G's
estimation, this led to respect for the physician's judgment.
312. Id.; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note 246.
313. Physician F, supra note 184.
314. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician E, supra note 162; Attorney C, supra note 247;
Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
315. Attorney C, supra note 247; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Appelbaum & Gutheil,
supra note 261, at 345. See also Melmon & Morrelli, supra note 101, at 111-12.
316. Attorney C, supra note 247; Interview with Attorney F. Attorney F conducts a private
practice, specializing in litigation, both in the mental health and criminal defense areas. He has
taught a course in mental health law at the University of Denver School of Law and serves on
the Mental Disabilities Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
Example 13: A man, who was certified but was being treated as an outpatient, suffered
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reached prior to a court hearing. Even if medication is ordered against the
patient's wishes, he may accept the decision in a positive way if he feels he
received a fair hearing.
3 17
The relative infrequency of medication hearings in Colorado to date
may have been influenced by nonmedical factors as well. Physicians are re-
luctant to go to court. 31 8 They are busy and resent taking the time to go to
court. 3 19 Many do not feel comfortable in a courtroom with its adversarial
setting and are intimidated by judges and the judicial system. 320 They do
not like to have their expertise challenged in court.32 1 Furthermore, they
resent "courtroom therapy" and do not trust judges to make what they con-
sider medical decisions. Judges are also uncomfortable making decisions im-
pinging upon medical treatment; 322 however, they understand clearly that it
is not their function as judge to make treatment decisions. 323 The impact of
these nonmedical factors may have diminished during the year that the Col-
orado regulations regarding the right to refuse medication have been in ef-
fect. Doctors and judges are becoming more experienced and comfortable
with medication hearings. 324 In addition, some doctors are attempting to
establish new dialogues and closer relationships with courts to facilitate the
process of going to court for medication hearings.
325
In the court hearing, the petitioner for medication bears the initial bur-
den of showing that the Goedecke criteria for court-ordered medication ex-
ists.326 The Goedecke decision provides that the petitioner must first prove
from a severe mental illness that led him to be highly agitated, irrational, violent, and a serious
danger to others. If he took medication, he was able to lead a fairly active life as an outpatient.
He believed he suffered from no mental illness and refused to take medication. He had suffered
some side effects five years prior to the hearing, but had experienced none recently. He based
his refusal of medication on the belief that if he were placed on drug treatment he would have
to tell potential employers and would not be able to get a job. If he was not medicated, he
would have to be institutionalized. The judge ruled against involuntary medication because the
patient had demonstrated a capacity to make a rational decision regarding treatment. He gave
the man a choice, either remain unmedicated and be placed in an institution or voluntarily
accept medication and continue to be treated as an outpatient. The man chose medication.
Judge A, supra note 256; Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 8-9.
317. Attorney A, supra note 197.
318. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227;
Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247; Redlich & Mollica, supra note 289, at 130.
319. Attorney D, supra note 253. One physician described going to court as an "incredible
problem," stating that it takes one-half day or longer; and in addition to the physician and
patient, two other staff persons have to go to court. Physician D, supra note 112. See also Stone,
The Myth ofAdvocacy, 30 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCH. 819, 822 (1979).
320. Physician B, supra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227.
321. Judge A, supra note 256; Attorney D, supra note 253.
322. judge C,supra note 306. Onejudge felt that if doctors are doing their job to treat their
patients according to their best medical judgment, they should not be afraid to go to court. Id.
323. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge C, supra note 306.
324. Judge A, supra note 256; Attorney D, supra note 253.
325. Judge A, supra note 256; Physician B, supra note 47.
326. This article covers only the treatment of mental illness in the civil system and not the
treatment of forensic patients who have been committed through the criminal system. Upon
the implementation of the regulations regarding the right to refuse medication, there was confu-
sion as to the refusal of medication by forensic patients, particularly as to which courts had
jurisdiction over involuntary medication of forensic patients. For a time, medication hearings
for forensic patients were held in a civil division. Interview with Judge B; Physician F, supra
note 184; Attorney E, supra note 299. The issue was brought to a head when a petition was filed
regarding the refusal of medication by a very difficult forensic patient, who was serving a life
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that the patient is not capable of making decisions affecting his or her
health.3 27 The petitioner must then show that the inability to make the deci-
sion is due to impaired judgment resulting from the patient's illness.3 28 In
addition to the Goedecke criteria, evidence must also be presented that the
regulations regarding the attempt to obtain voluntary consent have been
complied with in detail.3 29 The petitioner must further establish that the
medication for which an order is sought is part of a rational treatment
plan.3 30 Among the considerations in evaluating the propriety of the treat-
ment plan are whether the program of medication is designed to alleviate
the immediate symptoms of the illness, whether the medication is to be used
on a maintenance basis for an indefinite length of time, and whether the
medication will have to be continued in the community on an outpatient
basis.33 1 .The presence or absence of side effects is also important to the deci-
sion.
332
If the treatment plan appears to be appropriate, then the burden shifts
to the patient to show why the treatment plan, including medication, is not
suitable. It is presumed that a rational person would accept an appropriate
treatment plan. In order to prove he is competent to make the treatment
decision, the patient cannot give a mere recital of possible side effects, but
must demonstrate that he is aware of the potential benefits of the medica-
tion.3 3 3 If the patient can look only to the disadvantages of the treatment
and not recognize any of the advantages, he is unable to make a competent
decision. 334 In one court's experience, most patients have not understood
the potential positive effects of the medication, and medication has been or-
dered in nine out of ten hearings.
335
sentence, but who also had had a long history of mental illness. He suffered from tardive dys-
kinesia and had marked physicial symptoms. It was decided that his petition should be filed by
the Attorney General's office in the criminal division of the district court in which he was tried
and sentenced. This policy remains in effect today. Judge B; Physician F, supra note 184.
Judge B is probate judge in a Colorado district court. A large residential treatment center
is in his district.
327. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979).
328. Id.
329. Physician D, supra note 112.
330. Attorney D, supra note 253.
331. One judge commented that he was more apt to medicate on a short-term basis and less
apt to order medication on a long-term basis or if the medication would have to be continued in
the community. Judge C, supra note 306.
332. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge B, supra note 326; Judge C, supra note 306. Side effects
were very clearly present in most of the patients appearing for medication hearings in one court.
Judge B, supra note 326.
One commentator has questioned the ability ofjudges to rule in the area of mental health
treatment. "lJ]udges who presumably lack specialized medical and psychiatric training can
hardly be expected to rule swiftly and correctly upon the appropriateness of-treatments given to
the mentally ill. There are certainly no 'specific, judicially ascertainable and manageable stan-
dards' for measuring the adequacy or appropriateness of treatment." Schoenfeld, supra note
286, at 19.
333. Attorney D, supra note 253.
334. Id.
335. Judge B, supra note 326. Adverse consequences can result from the denial of involun-
tary medication by the court. One woman became violent in the hospital two days after the
court denied medication. Physician D, supra note 112. Another chronic schizophrenic was
gravely disabled and could not function on his own. The patient refused medication, but had
committed no recent overt act. An order for medication was denied, and because the hospital
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Medication may be ordered for the length of the period of the certifica-
tion,336 or its use may be limited to a relatively short period of time pending
review by the court. 337 In one instance, medication was ordered, but the
implementation of the order was delayed until the physician could obtain
more history about the patient.
338
If the treating facility or physician does not petition for a medication
hearing or the court upholds the patient's refusal, the right to refuse medica-
tion may have further consequences for the patient, the mental health pro-
fessionals, the mental health treatment system, and the community at large.
The length of hospitalization of mentally ill persons who refuse medication is
increased.339 The average hospital stay is only ten days when medication is
accepted, but if the patient refuses medication, he may be hospitalized thirty
days or longer 34° while his condition settles down to the point where he can
be released. If the condition deteriorates, or at least does not improve, he
may be hospitalized with relatively little treatment for a very long time.
341
He may, in effect, be warehoused. Some hospitals have waiting lists, and
other persons who need the institution's care may be unable to receive it.
3 4 2
In addition, the cost of treating the patient is greatly increased in proportion
to the length of stay.343 Patients who refuse medication not only are a bur-
den to society so far as the expense of hospitalization, but they also impose
substantial economic costs on society because they are nonproductive.
344
With medication, however, it is likely they can become contributing mem-
bers of society. 345 A further adverse effect is that physicians may leave staff
positions at hospitals because of the impediments to effective treatment of
patients caused by the right to refuse treatment. Staff turnover is detrimen-
tal to an institution's patients, and especially to those who need long-term,
intensive therapy.
346
If the patient refuses medication but his condition nevertheless im-
could not treat the patient without medication, the certification was terminated. The patient's
brother was forced to take the patient unwillingly. Physician F, supra note 184.
336. Judge A, supra note 256; Judge B, supra note 326; Judge C, supra note 306. One patient
who had side effects resulting from prolonged use of antipsychotic medication believed they
resulted from malaria, which the patient did not have. Judge A, supra note 256.
337. Judge C, supra note 306.
338. Id. &e Example 8, supra note 279.
339. Since the introduction of psychotropic drugs, the length of hospitalization for psychotic
episodes has been reduced by two-thirds. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 323.
340. Physician D, supra note 112; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra
note 246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
341. Peele, Chodoff & Taub, Involuntay Hospitaization and Treatability. Observations from the
Dirtrict of Colunbia Experzence, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 744, 749 (1974); Saphire, supra note 15, at
243-50. See Example 12, supra note 308.
342. Judge C, supra note 306; Physician G, supra note 227; Attorney D, supra note 253; Psy-
chiatric Nurse C, supra note 255. Because of the waiting list, this institution no longer will
accept patients on an emergency basis. Patients who need immediate treatment are often
forced to return to their families, who initially brought them in for treatment because of their
deteriorated condition, or must stay in jails until beds become available. Psychiatric Nurse C,
supra note 255.
343. &e Example 5, supra note 261.
344. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 10; Stone, supra note 247, at 267.
345. Physician B, sepra note 47; Physician G, supra note 227; Psychiatric Nurse A, supra note
246; Psychiatric Nurse B, supra note 247.
346. Physician B, supra note 47.
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proves, he may be released. The release of stabilized patients without thera-
peutic treatment may have several negative ramifications. One consequence
of the release of essentially untreated individuals into society is an accelera-
tion of the "revolving door" phenomenon. Chronic patients who take medi-
cation when hospitalized become stable and functional and return to the
community. After some time in the community, many feel they no longer
need medication and stop taking it. 34 7 Their condition deteriorates to the
point where they have to be rehospitalized, and the cycle begins again.
348
The numbers of patients being released into the community without medica-
tion will become part of this phenomenon, but their condition is likely to
deteriorate more rapidly, thus speeding up the cycle.
3 49
Another consequence of releasing untreated but stabilized persons into
the community is that a number may end up in the ghettos of mentally ill
persons which have resulted from deinstitutionalization.
350 Many mentally
ill persons who are released into the community have little ability to look
after themselves, limited coping capacities, and no friends or relatives with
whom to live. 35 1 Communities are unwilling to have group homes and half-
way houses for the deinstitutionalized mentally ill in residential neighbor-
hoods.352 Nursing homes and boarding homes are closing.
353 While the
need for more community mental health services increases, community re-
sources are diminishing as citizens are increasingly reluctant to pay increased
taxes to fund these services. 35 4 The right to refuse medication will contrib-
ute to this dilemma, as even more persons will be requiring support from
already overtaxed and underfunded community mental health centers.
355
347. Studies have shown that between one-quarter and one-half of patients stop taking re-
quired medication after several months. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 371; Lipton & Burnett,
supra note 18, at 334. In addition, 25-30% of outpatients receiving active medications drop out
of treatment. A. BECK, supra note 108, at 357. Up to 70% of patients who have had at least one
acute schizophrenic episode will relapse within three months to a year after they stop taking
medication. Lipton & Burnett, supra note 18, at 334, 337.
348. Saphire, supra note 15, at 249; Interview with Mental Health Worker A. Mental
Health Worker A is the team leader of an after-care treatment team associated with a residen-
tial treatment center. She has a master's degree and has worked in the field of mental health for
more than ten years. The team has 245 clients, in nursing homes, halfway houses, supervised
apartments, and family settings.
349. Physician A, supra note 8. See DuBose, supra note 53, at 1206-08.
350. Mental Health Worker A, supra note 348; Mechanic, supra note 11, at 272.
It has been estimated that of patients hospitalized for an acute episode of schizophrenia,
60% will be socially recovered five years later, 30% will show some psychopathology but will live
in the community, and the remaining 10% will be rehospitalized. Lipton & Burnett, supra note
18, at 323.
351. Bellak, supra note 53, at 5. The lack of community support often leads to exacerbation
of symptoms. Mechanic, supra note 11, at 53.
352. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 93, 104. This feeling has contributed in large measure to
the enactment of zoning restrictions against group homes. Id. at 93.
353. Physician B, supra note 47; Mental Health Worker A, supra note 348.
354. Physician E, supra note 162.
355. Stone, supra note 11, at 291.
"There is no question that the current cure provided to chronic patients in the community,
whether deinstitutionalized or never admitted, is inadequate." Talbott, Care ofthe Chronically
Mentally ll--St4ll a Nattonal Disgrace, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 688 (1979).
What . . . is happening . . . is that the right to treatment, coupled with other
developments, is leading to an abdication of responsibility for the treatment of the
chronically mentally ill in America. The civil libertarian strategy . . . has been a
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Unmedicated persons released into the community may be caught be-
tween the criminal and mental health systems. 356 Even if they are not dan-
gerous, their behavior is often not within the tolerance of society. 357 They
may end up in the criminal system for acts that are annoying or fall within
such criminal classifications as trespass, disturbance, or harassment. 358 They
often end up in jail where the conditions may be far worse than in the old
mental hospitals 359 and where there is no treatment available. 36° These mar-
ginal members of society are not wanted in the criminal system. 36 1 They
may be placed on probation on the condition they receive mental health
treatment, but often do not cooperate.
3 62
The mentally ill population of the jails throughout Colorado is increas-
smashing success. But what has become obvious in this tragic process is that the men-
tally ill are not political prisoners, they are not people who have been railroaded; they
are simply outcasts, persons whom nobody wants....
Stone, supra note I1, at 289.
356. Attorney D, supra note 253; R. Warner, The Impact of the Right to Refuse Psychiatric
Treatment Rulings on Local Jails, at 4 (Oct. 24-25, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at the
Fourth A.M.A. National Conference on Medical Care and Health Services in Correctional In-
stitutions, Chicago, Illinois).
357. Physician A, supra note 8; Warner, supra note 356, at 4. People feel burdened by hav-
ing people around whose behavior might be classed as peculiar, and the behavior of the men-
tally ill often has a negative effect on those around them. D. RUBIN, supra note 264, at 104;
Bellak, supra note 53, at 7; Stone, supra note 247, at 566.
Ralph Goedecke, whose case established the right to refuse treatment in Colorado, spent
several months in jail in 1980 as a result of behavior which might have been eliminated had he
not refused medication. Physician A, supra note 8.
358. Attorney A, supra note 197; Attorney D, supra note 253. "Many mentally ill persons
• . . have particular difficulty in accepting responsibility for their own actions and in con-
forming their behavior within socially prescribed bounds." Cameron, supra note 243, at 726.
There is . . . between madness and badness a large gray area which, depending on
cultural values and administrative practice, might be labelled as criminal or mental.
The major legal difficulty . . . is that in the gray area it might be possible to confine
someone simply by changing his label to conform to whichever allows the easier route
to confinement.
A. STONE, supra note 55, at 6.
359. Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 5; Warner, supra note 356, at 4. In a large city jail,
"lolne schizophrenic, for example, was found to be locked in a darkened linen closet which
served, so the staff said, as a 'secure room.' Such abuses of the mentally ill in U.S. jails are not
uncommon." Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 5.
360. Attorney B, supra note 202; Attorney D, supra note 253. It has been estimated that as
many as eight percent of jail inmates are functionally psychotic. Warner, supra note 356. In
addition, because of the lack of beds for treatment of the mentally ill on an emergency basis,
persons may spend up to five days in jail awaiting placement. Psychiatric Nurse C, supra note
255.
361. Physician E, supra note 162.
362. Example 14:
A young man held in the county jail on misdemeanor charges was evaluated by a
mental health center staff as suffering from schizophrenia. His charges were dropped
and he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital for treatment but refused medication.
Drug-free treatment in a residential program in the community was attempted as soon
as the patient was thought to be sufficiently cooperative, but he soon eloped, commit-
ted another crime, and returned to jail. The criminal court judge, with some anger at
the mental health system, held the young man in jail pending transfer to the forensic
unit of the state hospital for evaluation of his competency to stand trial.
Warner & Yeager, supra note 156, at 4.
For borderline mentally ill persons who refuse to cooperate with treatment efforts and re-
peatedly are picked up for minor offenses, the criminal system may have a therapeutic effect in
that they may be forced to accept responsibility for their actions. Mental illness is often used as
an excuse by such persons for their actions. Psychiatric Nurse C, supra note 255.
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ing.363 This same pattern was observed in California shortly after the Lant-
erman-Petris-Short Act of 1968 became effective. This law embodied stricter
criteria for hospitalization, emphasized community treatment, and included
the right to refuse treatment. After its enactment the use of civil commit-
ment drastically declined while the number of criminal commitments due to
findings of incompetency to stand trial dramatically increased. 364 In addi-
tion, a study of patients before and after the right to refuse medication was
implemented in California showed a significant increase in the number of
patients jailed after being able to refuse treatment.3 65 Another study of 500
previously hospitalized patients who were arrested showed that their offenses
generally derived from acute psychotic processes or from the poor judgment
and impulsive behavior characteristic of mental illness.
366
Finally, potentially dangerous individuals are being released into the
community as a result of the right to refuse treatment. Dangerousness is very
hard to predict. In fact, studies have demonstrated a marked tendency to-
ward overprediction. 367 Other studies have concluded that mentally ill per-
sons are generally no more dangerous than other members of society; 3 68
however, as more untreated mentally ill persons are released into society, the
number of persons who are mentally ill and may commit violent crimes in-
creases proportionately. 36 9 Persons who are dangerous are rational most of
the time; their violent acts are often the result of diminished impulse con-
trol.3 70 What will trigger a violent reaction in any individual cannot be
predicted with any accuracy.
37'
363. Attorney D, supra note 253.
364. Abrahamson, The Crimmalzation of Menta4ly Disordered Behavior. Possible Side-Effect of A
New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCH. 101 (1972).
365. J. Waters, J. Kindle & S. Rothman, Civil versus Criminal Confinement: Parallel Sys-
tems of Social Control of the Mentally Ill, at I I (Apr. 4, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at
Mental Health and the Law: A Symposium, Boulder, Colo.).
366. Id. at 12.
367. A. STONE, supra note 55, at 25-40; Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 58, at 1085; Ennis
& Litwack, supra note 188, at 711; Griffith & Griffith, supra note 58, at 257; Monahan, ra note
58, at 201; Peszke, Is Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitments?, 132 AM. J.
PSYCH. 825, 826 (1975); Shah, supra note 58, at 504; Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental
Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674, 705 (1974).
368. DuBose, supra note 53, at 1210; Shah, supra note 58, at 503; Zitrin, Crime and Violence
Among Mental Patients, 133 AM.J. PSYCH. 142, 147 (1976). One study found that a prediction of
dangerousness in the context of civil commitment was related to the length of the term for
which commitment was sought. Monahan, supra note 58, at 200.
369. Sosowsky, supra note 58, at 40.
370. Attorney D, supra note 253.
371. It is fairly easy to predict that violent behavior will occur within a short period of time,
for example, 72 hours, but it is very difficult to predict violence on a long-term basis. Physician
C, supra note 104. There is a certain group of patients with a previous history of committing
dangerous acts that one could predict would be possibly dangerous in the future. A. STONE,
supra note 55, at 33. However,
It is too often forgotten that dangerousness is an attribute not only of persons but of
situations and environmental factors; more correctly, dangerousness should be re-
garded as an outcome of the interaction of these various factors ...
This point, that of "interaction" between personal characteristics and situations,
cannot be stressed strongly enough.
Clinical Aspects, supra note 58, at 25.
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CONCLUSION
The treatment of mental illness has progressed within the past twenty
years from primarily institutional care to community-based treatment com-
bined with short-term hospitalization. This has been made possible in large
measure by the use of medication to treat mental illness. In addition, mental
patients have acquired a number of rights which have freed them from the
barren existence of confinement in an institution. Mentally ill persons in
Colorado have a recognized right to refuse medication, under which medica-
tion cannot be administered without their consent unless an emergency situ-
ation exists or a court order is obtained. The exercise of this right to refuse
medication seems to be changing the direction of the treatment of mental
illness.
First, doctors are going to court only in very limited circumstances to
obtain orders for medication for the most seriously ill or dangerous patients.
As a consequence, many mental patients who might benefit from drug ther-
apy are not receiving any medication. Second, patients who could be pro-
ductive with the use of medication become a burden on society, both in
terms of the increased length of hospitalization required to stabilize their
condition and because they are likely to be unproductive upon their release.
Third, mentally ill persons are increasingly being placed in the criminal sys-
tem, which does not want them and which provides no treatment for them.
Fourth, the mental health treatment system is being forced to regress, with
the increased use of restraints and seclusion, the inability to return patients
to society as soon as possible, and the increase in long-term hospitalization.
Several alternatives exist for unmedicated patients. They may improve
without medication, or they may continue to be hospitalized and remain
essentially untreatable-in effect, warehoused-while their condition deteri-
orates. Their condition may stabilize to the point where they may be re-
leased into the community. Possibly, they will be able to function well in the
community, or they may fall among the marginal members of society caught
between the mental health and the criminal justice systems. Alternatively
they may simply exist in the ghettos of deinstitutionalized mental patients
in rundown urban areas. If their behavior becomes out of control in the
hospital, they may be forcibly medicated under emergency procedures or
placed in restraints or in seclusion. If they become out of control in the
community, they are likely to end up in jail.
Their refusal of medication is often justified in light of the many side
effects of drugs used in the treatment of mental illness. The question then
becomes whether the unwanted side effects are more burdensome to the pa-
tients than being restrained, being jailed, or living a marginal existence in
society.
The Colorado requirement that a court order be obtained before medi-
cation can be administered involuntarily has placed burdens on both the
courts and the mental health facilities. Three alternatives to court hearings
on the issue of medication have been adopted by courts in other states which
have recognized the right to refuse medication. The first, which has been
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adopted in Massachusetts3 72 and Oklahoma,37 3 provides for the appoint-
ment of a guardian if it is determined in a court hearing that the patient is
incapable of making informed decisions regarding treatment. Initially, this
solution presents some of the same problems as the Colorado approach-for
example, the difficulty in getting into court within a short period of time
3 74
and the reluctance of physicians to go to court.3 75 An additional difficulty
would be the availability of a pool of guardians who would be able to be
appointed to serve both in an immediate crisis and over the term of treat-
ment. It is very likely that there would not be enough persons willing to
serve in this capacity.3 76 The guardian approach, however, would relieve
the courts from successive court hearings in the event additional decisions
would have to be made regarding the patient's refusal of medication.
Another alternative is the solution utilized in the Utah case of Colyer v.
District Court,377 in which it was held that before a mentally ill person can be
involuntarily hospitalized, the court must find that the person is unable to
make a rational decision as to the need for treatment. 3 78 This requirement
was subsequently codified, and the state must now prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the patient "lacks the ability to engage in a rational deci-
sion-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as
demonstrated by the evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and
benefits of treatment. '379 Once a person is hospitalized, all treatment deci-
sions would be made by the institution and treating physician, and a consul-
tation would not be necessary. 380 A drawback to this solution is the fact that
mentally ill persons are not necessarily incompetent to make treatment deci-
sions, although they may meet other criteria for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion.
38 1
The final alternative for allowing the use of medication to treat a men-
tally ill person who has refused such treatment has been adopted in the states
of New Jersey38 2 and Ohio.3 8 3 In New Jersey, Rennie v. Klein dictated that
the review be conducted by a psychiatrist outside the hospital:
The court . ..finds that independent review by psychiatrists,
372. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1364 (D. Mass. 1979).
373. In re the Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980).
374. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1363 (D. Mass. 1979).
375. Id.
376. Gutheil, Legal Guardianshtp in Drug Refusal: An /llusoov Solution, 137 AM. J. PSYCH. 347,
350 (1980).
377. 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979).
378. Id.
379. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10)(c) (Supp. 1979). In addition to the determination of
the patient's inability to make rational decisions regarding mental treatment, the court must
also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient has a mental illness, that because of the
illness the patient poses an immediate danger of physicial injury to others or self (including the
inability to provide the basic necessities of life), that there is no appropriate less restrictive alter-
native to court-ordered hospitalization, and that the hospital or mental health facility in which
the individual is to be hospitalized can provide the individual with treatment that is adequate
and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. Id. § 64-7-36(10)(a), (b), (d), (e).
380. A.E. v. Mitchell, No. C 78-466 (D. Utah 1980).
381. Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Stone, supra note 247, at 569-70; Warner, supra note 356, at 6.
382. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
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rather than by judges, lawyers or laypersons, would provide the
most accurate analyses of patient interests. Review within the pro-
fession would also create far less resentment among physicians and
staff whose decisions are questioned. . . . Informal inquiries
would be superior to formal procedures because the latter would
require more time and resources and often be more disruptive of
patient-doctor relations, but would not significantly decrease the
risk of erroneous determinations.
38 4
It has been suggested that the "competent tribunal" required by Goedecke
38 5
does not necessarily mean a court of law, but could be a review panel.
386
The United States Supreme Court held in Parham v.jR. 387 that "[d]ue proc-
ess has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of
fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. . . . Surely, this is
the case as to medical decisions, for 'neither judges nor administrative hear-
ing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judg-
ments.' "388 It is important, however, that the person reviewing requests for
medication be truly independent; that is, be compensated by someone other
than the institution whose petition for medication is being reviewed.
The court in Rennie v. Klein proposed a balancing test to evaluate
whether the patient's refusal of medication will prevail. The four elements of
the test are "(1) [the patient's] physical threat to [other] patients and staff at
the institution; (2) the patient's capacity to decide on his particular treat-
ment; (3) whether any less restrictive treatments exist; and (4) the risk of
permanent side effects from the proposed treatment. '38 9 This solution
would appear to provide a much better method of meeting the needs of the
patier s, the doctors and hospital staff, the institutions, and society than the
present requirement in Colorado that a court order must be obtained to ad-
minister medication on an involuntary basis.
Slightly more than a year has passed since the right to refuse medication
was recognized in Colorado. Its effect has been to turn the treatment of
mental illness in a regressive direction, while at the same time giving mental
patients the right to be free of very uncomfortable side effects of medication
if they so choose. Many issues have been raised about the direction in which
the mental health treatment system is going. A balance will have to be
achieved between the needs of the patients, the needs of society, and the
goals of mental health treatment if progress is going to continue to be made
in the treatment of mental illness.
384. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D.N.J. 1978).
385. Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979).
386. Attorney D, supra note 253.
387. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
388. Id. at 607.
389. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148 (D.N.J. 1978).
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